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Introduction 
Kenya efforts at combating corruption date back to the colonial period. Initial efforts at 
addressing corruption merely focused on how best to define corrupt behavior and determining 
how severely to punish offenders. In this period, an anti-corruption agency was not thought 
necessary. Corruption was not regarded as a systemic and endemic problem, but rather as a 
problem that could be resolved through discrete legislative amendments.  
Later efforts aimed at combating corruption embraced the idea that an anticorruption agency was 
a necessary component. This became clear at the apex of one party rule in the 1980’s which also 
coincided with revelations of grand corruption. Initial anticorruption agencies were part of the 
police force and lacked the independence, resources and legislative mandate to undertake their 
tasks. The eventual establishment of the Kenyan Anti-Corruption Authority in the late 1990s 
with a legislative mandate was short-lived when the courts declared it unconstitutional in part 
because the then Constitution only conferred prosecutorial powers on the Attorney General. 
Thus, the rise of an anticorruption authority in the context of an authoritarian and corrupt 
government was met with judicial disapproval. The entire government was corrupt.  
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Broader efforts at fighting corruption such as the enactment of the Public Officer’s Ethics Act in 
2003 exemplify initiatives at promoting good governance in all its aspects – including the 
establishment of a cabinet level Secretary in charge of Governance and Ethics and the 
appointment of a former Transparency International (Kenya) Chair to the position; the 
requirement that public officers declare their wealth. Another significant example of the broader 
efforts designed to fight corruption was the effort to entrench the Kenya Anti-Corruption 
Commission in the Constitution. Such entrenchment, it was argued, would insulate anti-
corruption investigations and prosecutions for violating other constitutional rules such as 
separation of powers or the presumption of innocence. Significant amendments to anti-corruption 
laws following the 2003 election of President Mwai Kibaki and appointment of credible anti-
corruption crusaders to lead the campaign were met with further pushback from Parliament and 
leading politicians who hounded anticorruption crusaders like Mr. Githongo from office and 
repeatedly declined to pass constitutional amendments to insulate the Kenya Anti-Corruption 
Commission from judicial challenges for its unconstitutionality and its investigatory powers.  
Grand scale corruption even after the election of a new President in 2002 who promised an end 
to corruption has however almost come to naught – all three branches of government were 
staffed with suspected corruption offenders, the country had an Attorney General unwilling to 
prosecute high level corruption suspects and a judiciary keenly concerned about the abuse of the 
procedural rights of those who were sought to be prosecuted than the broad goals of the anti-
corruption agenda. Resignations of government ministers suspected to have been involved in 
high level corruption were followed by a return to government after investigatory commissions 
white-washed the scandals.  
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Anti-corruption efforts continue to be hobbled in the coalition government of President Mwai-
Kibaki and Prime-Minister Raila Odinga that was formed in 2008. The August 2010 Constitution 
provides new hope – it entrenches an Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, and enshrines the 
principles of transparency, public officer ethics and accountability. The new Constitution of 
Kenya overwhelmingly ratified in August 2010 is the latest glimpse of hope in Kenya’s 
anticorruption journey. A constitutionally enshrined Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission 
will replace the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission. Looking ahead, Parliament still retains the 
authority to explicitly give such a Commission the authority to prosecute and one of the 
challenges remains whether or not Parliament will do so or if it will continue the legacy of 
capitalizing on lack of legal clarity about the powers of the most important anti-corruption 
agency in the country. This paper examines Kenya’s efforts at combating corruption in a 
historical context seen against the promise of the new Constitution and the lessons these efforts 
have for other countries. 
This paper is divided into five parts. In Part I, I discuss the origins of the anti-corruption 
initiatives in the 1952 Prevention of Corruption Act. Part II fast forwards to 1991 when after 
about five decades a new flurry of legislative activity started with the creation of the first 
anticorruption institutions in the country. Part III analyzes the demise of the Kenyan Anti-
Corruption Authority indicating push back from the judiciary as politicians in one-party 
authoritarian Kenya sought judicial cover against corruption charges. Part IV examines the 
promising rise of a new government in 2002 elected on an anticorruption platform while Part V 
details the extensive legislative changes that were enacted by the new government. Finally, Part 
VI brings the anti-corruption agenda to date by examining the continuing challenges following 
the enactment of a new Constitution in August 2010.  
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Part I: Initial Steps in the Fight against Corruption 
 
A) The Passing of the Prevention of Corruption Bill, 1956 and the First Amendments 
 
The first piece of anti-corruption legislation passed by the Kenyan Government was the 
Prevention of Corruption Act in 1956.1  At the time, Kenya was still a British Colony and would 
be for another six years.  The objective of this bill was to make it nearly certain that those who 
engaged in corrupt practices were caught and punished.2  It was thought that certainty of 
detection would be a better deterrent than very harsh punishments for those found to be corrupt.3 
The Minister for Legal Affairs, Mr. Conroy, elucidated argued that “[I]t is no good enacting 
Draconian laws, which impose exceptionally heavy penalties on the people for the purpose of 
frightening them from the commission of crime, because [it was believed] that does not work in 
practice.”4
 
 
Shortcomings were eventually found in the Prevention of Corruption Act.  One issue arose from 
the language of section three of the Prevention of Corruption Bill which provided that a person 
would be guilty under the act if he offers a bribe “…knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe that doing so may lead to the doing of an act by that other person which constitutes an 
                                                          
1 The Prevention of Corruption Act, (1956) Cap. 65 (repealed). 
2 Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Prevention of Corruption Bill, July 20 1956, col. 137-38 (statement 
by Mr. Conroy, Minister for Legal Affairs). 
3 Id. at 137-38 (statement by Mr. Conroy, Minister for Legal Affairs). 
4 Id. (statement by Mr. Conroy, Minister for Legal Affairs). 
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offense under subsection (1) of this section.” 5  The problem with this provision was that 
establishing the briber’s intent in soliciting a bribe was subjective and difficult to know 
truthfully.6  Attorney General Charles Njonjo illustrated a problem that arose from this language 
when he discussed a case in which the defendant was caught trying to offer a bribe to a public 
service member.7 The defendant subsequently used the excuse that he was only offering the 
bribe to see if the public service member would corruptly take it.  The court apparently accepted 
the defendant’s story at face value and the defendant was not found guilty of corruption since he 
never intended to actually give the bribe.8
 
  
The Prevention of Corruption Bill was amended in 1967 to address this issue of the motive 
behind a bribe-giver’s offer.  The amended provision of the Prevention of Corruption Bill was 
changed to state: 
 
“Any person who shall by himself or in conjunction with any other person, corruptly 
give, promise or offer any gift, loan, fee, reward, consideration or advantage whatever 
to any person, whether for the benefit of that person or otherwise on account of, any 
member officer or servant of any public body doing or forbearing to do, or having done 
or forborne to do, anything in respect of any matter or transaction whatsoever, actual or 
                                                          
5 Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill, Oct. 19, 1967, col. 
942-43 (statement by Mr. Njonjo, Attorney General). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
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proposed or likely to take place, in which the said public body is concerned shall be 
guilty of a felony.” 9
 
The text in the amended law stated nothing about the state of mind of the bribe-giver when she 
offered a bribe.  The Act provided that it was irrelevant whether the benefit is for that person or 
for any other reason, as long as a person corruptly offers a gift, loan or some other advantage to a 
public servant in exchange for that public servant to do or not do something.  This offence was 
classified as a felony.
 
10
 
 
Parliament debated at length whether the impact of holding both bribe giver and taker guilty 
would have on how many instances of corruption would be reported.11  Mr. Wariithi argued that 
in the past the Prevention of Corruption Act was intended to punish corrupt public servants who 
received a bribe.12 By contrast, the amended law would punish persons who offered the bribe.13  
For Mr. Wariiithi, the main reason for targeting the bribe-taker was that public servants were 
“making a mockery of the public service”14
                                                          
9 The Prevention of Corruption Act, amended (1967) Cap. 65 §3(2); see also Kenya, The National Assembly, 
Debates on the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill, Oct. 19, 1967, col. 952-53 (statement of Mr. Osogo, 
The Minister for Information and Broadcasting) (reading the relevant portion of the amended Act). 
 because many of them would demand bribes in order 
10 The Prevention of Corruption Act, amended (1967) Cap. 65 §3(2) 
11 Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill, Oct. 19, 1967, col. 
962-64 (statement by Mr. Wariithi) 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
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to perform basic duties which the government owed its people.15 Some of these duties included 
permits for funeral services, getting a required Kenya Identification card, and building permits.16 
Mr. Wariithi discussed that the absence of an anti-corruption agency meant that public officials 
could mainly be exposed by those who had offered them a bribe.17  By punishing the bribe-giver, 
Mr. Waritthi argued that there would no longer be someone to blow the whistle on corrupt 
officials. Why would anyone go to the effort to try and “trap” a public official into accepting a 
bribe when, in so doing, they would be equally as guilty under the new law wondered Mr. 
Waritthi?18  This “conspiracy of silence” would result in a decline in reported cases of corruption 
in Kenya.19
 
 
The proposed amendments to the Prevention of Corruption Act also sparked a debate on what 
exactly constitutes a “gift.”20  A broad range of opinions were expressed.  Mr. Shikuku suggested 
that a public figure should not accept any gifts regardless of whether they are a “bribe” or just a 
friendly gesture.21
                                                          
15 Id. 
  He argued that even if a gift is just given as a gesture of kindness, it may 
16 See James Thuo Gathii, Defining the Relationship between Human Rights and Corruption, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L  L. 
125, 182-183 (2009) [hereinafter Gathii, Human Rights and Corruption] (discussing how poor people in developing 
countries often have to pay bribes for the most fundamental of government services). 
17 Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill, Oct. 19, 1967, col. 
962-64 (statement by Mr. Wariithi). 
18 Id. 
19 Hansard on The Prevention of Corruption Act, p. 2. 
20 Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill, Oct. 19, 1967, col. 
962-64 (statements made by several different ministers) 
21 Id. at  945-47 (statement by Mr. Shikuku) 
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affect the public servant’s decision-making in the future.22  If that person comes to him for a 
favor in the future, even though that was not the purpose of the gift at the time, the public servant 
would have a difficult time turning him down than he would when dealing with someone who 
had not given him a gift in the past.23  Mr. Shikuku illustrated his argument as follows.  If two 
people applied for a loan, and one had given a gift to the public servant in the past as a courtesy, 
even though there was no intent to corrupt, the gift giver will have a better chance of getting the 
loan he needs.  It is because of these unintentional consequences which may result sometime in 
the future that Mr. Shikuku and others supported the proposition that public servants shouldn’t 
be allowed to accept gifts in any form.24    Like the Parliamentarians in the 1950s, Mr. Shikuku 
was concerned about making the subjective intent of the bribe-giver irrelevant in determining 
their culpability.25
 
  He thought a person who gives a gift or offers a bribe can easily hide their 
true purpose and thus may be able to circumvent the purpose of the law in preventing corruption.  
Such cases are possible where the repayment of the favor would not be sought for some time 
after the gift is given.  It is nearly impossible to say at the time one is given a gift, whether it is a 
goodwill gesture or something else, for which a return favor will be sought down the road.  
Other members of the Kenyan Parliament felt that “gift” must be carefully defined, because gifts 
which are given out of gratitude and not for the purposes of corrupting public officers should be 
allowed. Mr. Osogo, the Minister for Information and Broadcasting, for instance, felt that the 
amendment was only for the purpose of punishing those who “knowingly and intentionally tr[y] 
                                                          
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 945-46 
25 Id. 
11 
 
to corrupt a public officer.”26  However, no amendments defining the word “gift” were made. 
The word “gift” remained in §3.1 and §3.2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act without further 
clarification.27
 
 
 
Part II. The Amendments of 1991 and the Establishment of an Anti-
Corruption Body 
 
Up until 1991, Kenya’s anti-corruption framework remained mostly unchanged from colonial 
times – a four decade period.  However, from 1991 very significant changes were made to 
combat corruption in Kenya. This part will examine the 1991 Amendments made to the 
Prevention of Corruption Act and the creation of the first Anti-Corruption Squads.  Part Two will 
discuss subsequent anti-corruption legislation put in place after revelations of grand corruption in 
scandals like the Goldenberg Affair.  These changes resulted in the creation of the much more 
elaborate and sophisticated Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA) to fight corruption.  Part 
Three will discuss the organization and structure of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority, how it 
came into being and its rocky beginnings under the leadership of John Harun Mwau.  This part 
will then after discuss the later appointment of Aaron Ringera to lead the KACA and the body’s 
increasing effectiveness during this time. 
                                                          
26 Id. at  955-57 (statement by Mr. Osogo, The Minister for Information and Broadcasting). 
27 See The Prevention of Corruption Act, (1967) Cap. 65 §§3.1–3.2.  Available at  
http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/Reports/LawsandConventions/Kenya_Prevention_of_Corruption_Act_1956_Repea
led.pdf 
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A) The Amending of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Creation of the First 
Anti-Corruption Squads in Kenya. 
 
The Anti-Corruption Squad was established in 1991 following demands by the public for action 
to be taken against those engaging in corruption.28  At this time that anti-corruption concerns had 
began to move to the forefront of the international donor community’s dialogue.29  Transparency 
International was founded in 1993,30
 
 and would prove to be an influential player in the 
international fight against corruption through its studies and releasing of statistics ranking 
countries on how rampant corruption was in their country and how successful their anti-
corruption measures were proving to be in practice. 
                                                          
28 JOHN KITHOME TUTA, KENYA’S ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, CONTROL OF 
CORRUPTION IN KENYA, LEGAL-POLITICAL DIMENSIONS 2001-2004, 66 (Ben Sihanya ed.) (2005) [hereinafter  TUTA, 
CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA] 
29 Gathii, Human Rights and Corruption, supra note 16, at 19 –21 (discussing the emergence of corruption as an 
emerging focus in international law only beginning to occur in 1960s – 1970s).  Professor Gathii goes on to discuss 
several reasons for why there was such a delay by the international community in pushing for anti-corruption 
initiatives in developing countries.  Id. at 12-18.  Some of the reasons given for why the international community, 
and in particular the west ignored corruption in developing countries for so long include; (1) fear of criticizing 
fledgling governments, (2) optimism from western countries that Africa would develop much like they had, a period 
of corruption followed by a flourishing period of growth, (3) the Cold War dividing the world via political system, 
and thereby causing the western countries to support any democratic country, regardless of how corrupt it was, and 
(4) the idea of “virtuous bribery,” meaning that corruption and bribery actually aided a developing country because 
it allowed for the circumventing of inefficient regulations. Id. 
30 Transparency International website, available at http://www.transparency.org/about_us. 
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The Anti-Corruption Squad was a special investigative unit answerable to the Criminal 
Investigations Department - it was part of the Kenya Police and was headed by a Senior Police 
Officer.31  The Anti-Corruption Squad proved ineffective in its fight against corruption.32  It had 
only a few investigators, who were paid the same as regular police officers.33  Furthermore, 
owing to the fact that it was part of the executive branch and not an independent agency, its 
investigators were undoubtedly afraid to investigate cases of high level corruption or corruption 
within the government in general.34  The government under President Moi was notoriously 
corrupt and relied on a system of patronage and bribery to maintain order and control.35  The 
Anti-Corruption Squad officers were hesitant to pursue corrupt officials who were their superiors 
and responsible for their employment and pay.  It is also worth mentioning that there were 
allegations that the Anti-Corruption Squad itself was corrupt.36  This was not surprising since for 
years the Police Department has widely been considered the most corrupt sector of the 
government.37
                                                          
31 TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA, supra note 28, at 66. 
 Even today the Kenyan public still regards the Police as among the most corrupt 
in government. Police often take bribes to refrain from giving out traffic tickets and arresting 
32 Id. at 66-67. 
33 Id. at 66. 
34Id. at 67.  
35 Nick Wadhams, Kenyan President Moi’s Corruption Laid Bare, THE TELEGRAPH U.K., Sept. 1, 2007 (discussing 
how Moi and his two sons ran the government corruptly for their own gain). 
36 TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA , supra note 28, at 67.  
37 Survey: Police are Most Corrupt in Kenya, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, July 18, 2008, available at 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2008/07/18/Survey-Police-are-most-corrupt-in-Kenya/UPI-86741216399685.  
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people found breaking the law.38  The Anti-Corruption Squad lasted for roughly three years, and 
was disbanded after a fire burnt files held by the squad.  At the time of its disbandment, it had 
made little headway in the fight against corruption.39
 
 
B)  The Establishment of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Squad and the Goldenberg 
Scandal which Gave Rise to its Creation. 
 
Notwithstanding the failings and weaknesses inherent in Kenya’s first anti-corruption institution, 
the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA) was established as an investigative body to help 
discover and curb instances of corruption.  President Moi was widely believed to have 
established the KACA to retain large amounts of donor aid flowing into the country through both 
western countries and international organizations.40
                                                          
38 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, EAST AFRICAN BRIBERY INDEX (2009) (stating that based on a survey of over 
10,000 people, the police department of Kenya is the most corrupt institution in all of East Africa).  Available at 
  Kenya had nearly lost all of its aid from the 
World Bank after the World Bank suspended all aid flowing into the country besides emergency 
and critical human development assistance because of the pervasive and endemic nature of 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases_nc/2009/2009_07_02_kenya_index; see also 
Robyn Dixon and Nicholas Soi, Police Corruption Rampant in Kenya Despite Attempts at Reform, L.A. TIMES, June 
13, 2004 (discussing the rampant corruption in the Kenya Police through several people’s  stories of bribes and 
imprisonment). 
39 TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA, supra note 28, at 67.  
40 Hon. Musikari Kombo, Assistant Minister, Ministry of Planning and National Development , Corruption and 
Economic Reforms in Kenya, at the 11th  International Anti-Corruption Conference, in Adili Transparency Int’l, 
June 2003, at 3-4. [hereinafter Corruption and Economic Reforms in Kenya] Available at 
http://www.tikenya.org/documents/Adili38.pdf. 
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corruption in Kenya.  KACA’s establishment was therefore not an indication that the government 
was dedicated to fighting corruption. 
 
As noted above, the Goldenberg scandal had led to the withdrawal of foreign aid flows to Kenya.  
The scandal involved a plot between a Kenyan businessman, Kamlesh Pattni and several high-
level members of the Kenyan government.  Mr. Pattni is alleged to have conspired with these 
government officials to have his company, Goldenberg International, be awarded government 
contracts to export fictitious amounts of gold and diamonds from Kenya to the rest of the world.  
In return the official would be compensated with a percentage of the money Kenya made from 
the sale.41  Under the agreement, the Kenyan government agreed to pay Goldenberg International 
at the rate of 35% of its exports.  This is well above the 20% set as the limit under the Local 
Manufacturers (Export Compensation) Act.42  When the Commissioner of Customs and Excise 
Department declined to pay this inflated compensation, Mr. Saitoti as the Minister of Finance 
ordered it to be paid from the Treasury anyways.43  This inflated illegal compensation percentage 
resulted in Goldenberg International being paid an extra $4.2 million over the course of two 
years. 44
 
  These monies constituted public funds that it otherwise wouldn’t have had to pay, had 
the government contracted out for an appropriate compensation rate. 
                                                          
41 James Thuo Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reforms: Expanding the Promises and Possibilities of the Rule of Law 
as an Anti-Corruption Strategy in Kenya, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 407, 428 (1999) [hereinafter Gathii, Corruption and 
Donor Reforms]. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 429. 
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C) The Creation of the KACA, its Framework and Effectiveness in Fighting 
Corruption 
 
The KACA was created by an amendment to the Prevention of Corruption Act which added 
section11B. That amendment set out KACA’s mandate as being: 
a. To take necessary measures for the prevention of corruption in the public, 
parastatal and private sectors; 
b. To investigate, and subject to the directions of the Attorney General, to 
prosecute for offences under this Act and other offences involving corrupt 
transactions; and 
c. to advise the Government and the parastatal organizations on ways and means 
of preventing corruption; 
d. to inquire and investigate the extent of liability of any public officer in the lots 
of any public funds and institute civil proceedings against the officer and any 
other person involved in the transaction which resulted in the loss for the 
recovery of such loss; 
e. to investigate any conduct of a public officer which is connected with or 
conducive to corrupt practices and to make suitable recommendation thereon; 
f. to undertake such further or other investigations as may be directed by the 
Attorney General. 45
 
 
                                                          
45See Stephen Mwai Gachiengo & Albert Muthee Kahuria v. Republic, (2000) from the Republic of Kenya in the 
High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, High Court Miscellaneous Application No. 302 of 2000 at page 7. 
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Unlike the Anti-Corruption Squad, KACA had a fairly elaborate institutional framework.  The 
1997 amendment had also created the Kenya Anti-Corruption Advisory Board (KAAB) whose 
membership was comprised of people from professional, religious, labor, and non-governmental 
organizations.46 This body was created to advise KACA on how to go about fighting corruption. 
At the helm, KACA had a director and three assistant directors who were responsible for 
investigations, prosecutions, financing and operations.  KAAB served as an advisory board to 
ensure the investigators were made aware of the opinions and concerns of all different sectors of 
the society.47
 
 
Despite being given an elaborate framework enable it to successfully carry out investigations and 
prosecutions and being relatively independent from the three branches of government, KACA 
struggled from its inception.  Its first director John Harun Mwau and his staff had no well laid 
down plans to combat corruption.  In fact, John Harun Mwau was probably not the most 
qualified choice to head the body to fight corruption, and he was apparently appointed to the 
position as head of KACA in return for dropping out of the 1997 Presidential elections.48
                                                          
46 TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA, supra note 28, at 67. 
  If this 
is so, Mwau was appointed to office not based on merit, but instead based on Kenya’s system of 
patronage and bribery. Perhaps Mwau’s lack of qualification for the position of Director of the 
KACA was responsible for the fractured and incoherent approach the KACA took at first in the 
47 TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA, supra note 28, at 68. 
48 See, Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reforms, supra note 41, at 438 (“However, prior to his appointment as the 
Director of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority, Mwau withdrew his candidacy for the presidential elections in 
December 1997. Upon his withdrawal from the presidential race, Mwau then asked his supporters to vote for 
President Moi.”). 
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fight against corruption.49 The resources given to the KACA were minimal and as such it was 
impeded from successfully investigating and prosecuting cases of corruption.  Director Mwau 
had to resort to donating his private offices so that the KACA would have a base for its 
operations.50
 
 
John Harun Mwau and the KACA did eventually bring to court senior court officials on charges 
of corruption.  In 1998, Kenya Revenue Authority senior officials from the Ministry of Finance, 
were charged in court in a case involving then powerful Cabinet Minister Simeon Nyachae.51  
However, Attorney General Amos Wako terminated the cases brought to court by the KACA. 
The Attorney General argued that the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority had gone to court 
without first obtaining the AG’s consent to prosecute as required by the Constitution.52  The 
Attorney General’s reasons for terminating the cases were not persuasive.  The alleged offenses 
committed by the Finance Minister and other government officials were related to fraudulent 
imports.53 Cases involving fraudulent imports generally were not of the type that first required 
the consent of the AG.54
                                                          
49 See, TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA, supra note 28, at 68 (describing the initial efforts of the KACA 
as being “unconventional” and “unorthodox”). 
 
50 See, Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reforms, supra note 41  
51 Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reforms, supra note 41, at 441. 
52 Id.; see also TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA , supra note 28, at 68.  . 
53 TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA, supra note 28, at 68. 
54 Id. (“In particular, it was alleged that Mwau had acted ultra vires his powers by arraigning suspects in court 
without the sanction of the Attorney General Amos Wako.  Incidentally, the matter in issue arose from offences 
touching on fraudulent imports that ordinarily did not require the consent or sanction of the Attorney General before 
prosecution.”). 
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Not only did the Kenyan Executive branch remove the KACA’s cases from the docket, it also 
went on to remove its leader as well.  The President appointed a tribunal to evaluate the 
competence of Director Mwau not long after he and his agency brought some judicial officers 
and high level ministers to court on corruption charges.55  The timing of this effort to investigate 
Mwau caused many to wonder whether this was related to the charges brought against senior 
officials.  It is very plausible that the Director was sought to be removed for being a thorn in the 
side of the corrupt government.56  The tribunal declared Mr. Mwau “incompetent” and the 
President accordingly removed him from his post as Director.57
 
  
The judiciary had once again stepped in and impeded the agency and its fight against corruption.  
This was rapidly becoming common happenstance and once again the judiciary had acted on 
questionable legal grounds.  While Director Mwau’s methods in leading the KACA may have 
                                                          
55 Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reforms, supra note 41, at 445 (“These events began to lead to questions about the 
government's commitment to eliminating corruption in the country. It appeared as if the appointment of Harun 
Mwau to head the Anti-Corruption Authority was part of a government design to merely put up a big show of its 
commitment to fighting corruption to win the donor community's approval for resumption of the enhanced structural 
enhancement facility.”). 
56 Corruption and Economic Reforms in Kenya, supra note 40, at 3-4. 
57 Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reform, supra note 41, at 442; see also TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN 
KENYA,  supra note 41, at 68; MARS GROUP KENYA,  A MARS GROUP REPORT ON THE REPORT OF THE KENYA ANTI-
CORRUPTION COMMISSION TO PARLIAMENT 2005-2006 (“John Harun Mwau was dismissed for incompetence 
following a tribunal appointed under the [Prevention of Corruption Act].”).  The tribunal found that Harun Mwau 
had “too highly inflated a view of himself to work in harmony with others.”  Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reforms, 
supra note 41, at 446. 
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been questionable at first,58
 
 the Director and his agency had just started to show progress and 
initiative in fighting corruption when this decision to remove him was made.  The government 
partly redeemed itself when it named Justice Aaron Ringera as Mr. Mwau’s replacement. This 
does not, however, end the Executive from getting in the way of the anti-corruption agenda. As 
we shall see, Aaron Ringera was forced to resign in shame several years later. 
Before his appointment to head KACA, Mr. Ringera had been a well-respected High Court 
Judge.  As a High Court Judge, he had an extremely strong legal background unlike Mwau who 
had none.  Notwithstanding such a promising appointee, some still suggested that this 
appointment was motivated by a desire to appease donors so that Kenya could retain its 
international aid flow.  There were doubts that the government was committed to eliminating 
corruption.59  That notwithstanding, this appointment of High Court Judge Ringera ushered in 
the so-called “golden age” of the KACA.60  No longer were the anti-corruption plans of the 
agency scattered and incoherent, but instead a comprehensive strategy for investigating and 
prosecuting those in office found to be acting corruptly was put in place.61
                                                          
58 See Supra Notes 48 – 49 and accompanying text. 
  Using a three-
pronged approach, the KACA under Mr. Ringera made steps toward building a culture of 
accountability and transparency in Kenya.  This approach included: “[t]he consistent 
enforcement of the law against corruption; the prevention of corruption by removing the 
opportunities that facilitate the crime; and the education of the public and enlistment of their 
59 Corruption and Economic Reforms in Kenya. supra, note 40, at 3. 
60 TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA , supra note 28, at 69. 
61 Id. (describing the KACA under Ringera as “the most serious attempt the Government had hitherto made towards 
the eradication of corruption.”). 
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support in the fight against corruption.”62  For the first time, the KACA had offered some hope 
that all would not be the same any more.63
 
  However, this was not destined to last. 
Part III.  Gachiengo Decision and the Demise of the Kenyan Anti-Corruption 
Authority 
 
In 2000 the anti-corruption fight experienced another major setback from a decision handed 
down by a Constitutional Court.  In Stephen Mwai Gachiengo & Albert Muthee Kahuria v. 
Republic of Kenya (hereinafter “Gachiengo”) a Constitutional Court held that KACA’s existence 
was a violation of the constitutional separation of powers and consequently found that it was 
unconstitutional.64  In this landmark corruption prosecution case, the defense, on behalf of four 
persons, raised four constitutional questions regarding the KACA and the Prevention of 
Corruption Act:65
                                                          
62 Corruption in Kenya: A Call to Action, (Bulletin of the Institute of Economic Affairs), August 2000, at 4. 
  First, whether it was contrary to the separation of powers for High Court 
Judge Ringera to also serve as director of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority.  That Judge 
Ringera must, therefore, choose to be either a High Court Judge or Director of the KACA.  
Second, whether having a High Court Judge as Director of KACA prevents the accused from 
enjoying the right to a fair trial because the lower court Magistrates will be hesitant to rule 
against the High Court Judge who obviously felt that the accused were guilty if he had the 
KACA investigate and prosecute them.  Third whether the Attorney General’s consent to the 
63 TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA , supra note 28, at 69. 
64 See the Ruling in Stephen Mwai Gachiengo & Albert Muthee Kahuria v. Republic from the Republic of Kenya in 
the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, High Court Miscellaneous Application No. 302 of 2000. 
65 Id. at 2. 
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prosecutions initiated by the KACA was valid under the constitution; and fourth whether §11(B) 
of The Prevention of Corruption Act, which established KACA, was in conflict with the 
Constitution.66
 
 
With regard to question one – whether Justice Ringera sitting as the Director of the Kenya Anti-
Corruption Authority violates separation of powers – the Constitutional Court held that it was an 
unconstitutional breach of separation of powers to have Justice Ringera be a member of both the 
Executive and the Judiciary. As such he had to choose to either remain a High Court Judge or 
retire from the High Court and continue to direct the KACA.67  The Court’s reasoning was that 
the judiciary should not be “subject to the dictates of either the executive or the legislature” and 
when Judge Ringera took his oath to head the KACA he became a part of the Executive branch 
also and was no longer bound by the judicial oath.68  As such, the court ruled that Justice 
Ringera’s position as High Court Judge was being compromised.69
 
 
The court went on to hold that it is only the Attorney General who is permitted under the 
Constitution to prosecute.70
                                                          
66 Id. 
  Given the fact that the Attorney General was not controlling or 
67 Id. at 8-13. 
68 Id. 
69 Id.  The court also held by acting as director of KACA, Judge Ringera did not prevent those accused of corruption 
from the right to a fair trial.  Id. at 2-4. 
70 Id. at 5.  The court held that the Attorney General’s consent to KACA prosecuting corruption-related defenses was 
given as a “formality” – and that this consent was not valid under the constitution.  Id. at 7-8.  Furthermore, the court 
held that although the Attorney General consented to these corruption prosecutions through a prior written consent, 
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actively overseeing KACA, as required by §26(3), §26(b), and §26(c) of the Constitution; the 
court declared KACA to be unconstitutional.  According to the court, KACA was a corporate 
entity and not an agency complementary to the Attorney General and as such it could not 
unilaterally investigate and prosecute cases.71
 
 
The court in addition, held that §10 and §11B of The Prevention of Corruption Act, which 
created the KACA and set out guidelines for it to fight against corruption, were in direct conflict 
with §26 of the Constitution which gave the Attorney General his exclusive prosecutorial 
powers.72  As such, the court held that KACA undermined the Commissioner of Police and the 
Attorney General because its investigatory and prosecutorial powers were infringing on the 
powers and rights vested to these institutions by the Constitution.73
 
 
This effect of this decision effectively terminated the KACA’s existence.74
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in reality, the Attorney General had very little say and control over KACA, which is only answerable to its Director 
or the Advisory Board.  Id. at 6. 
  The court’s holding 
– that the Attorney General’s prior consent to KACA prosecutions was not valid and that the 
KACA was acting unilaterally, separate from the Attorney General, and in violation of the 
71 Id. at 8. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 8-9. 
74 MWALIMU MATI AND JOHN GITHONGO, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND THE FIGHT 
AGAINST CORRUPTION IN KENYA 9 (2001) (“[As a result of the Gachiengo decision the KACA was] effectively . . . 
declared unconstitutional and its operations halted.”). 
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constitution has been very widely and, in my view, correctly criticized as being incorrect.75  The 
Attorney General himself spoke out after the decision saying that his “office was working 
harmoniously with KACA”76 and that his ultimate control and direction over the prosecutions 
was never put in jeopardy by the KACA’s investigation and prosecution of corruption-related 
crimes.77
 
  
A major shortcoming of the Gachiengo decision was that the High Court did not correctly 
construe §26 of the Kenyan Constitution. §26 states in part:  
The Attorney-General shall have power in any case in which he considers it 
desirable so to do: (a) to institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any 
person before any court (other than a court-martial) in respect of any offence 
alleged to have been committed by that person; (b) to take over and continue any 
                                                          
75 Id. (“True, the argument goes, Justice Ringera was not entitled to straddle in both the judiciary and KACA, but the 
court should have looked at the public policy good that KACA was necessary to fight corruption in a situation where 
even the government admitted that conventional law enforcement mechanisms and institutions are unable to do so.  
Furthermore, it was possible as happened in the case of Judge Heath of the SIU to make an innovative ruling that would 
serve to preserve separation of powers and maintain an independent anti-corruption authority.”); see also KACA Bills – 
The Way Forward, K Miwge (discussing the errors in the Judges’ reasoning and also the difficulty in solving the 
problem of creating an anti-corruption agency when it is widely regarded that the KACA was actually perfectly 
constitutional); Gathii, Human Rights and Corruption, supra note 16, at 161 (discussing how Kenyan courts have 
oftentimes use procedural human rights and a narrow reading of constitutional principles to protect high level 
government officials from charges of corruption). 
76 KACA Bills – The Way Forward, K Miwge, p. 1. 
77 Id. 
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such criminal proceedings that have been instituted or undertaken by another 
person or authority; and (c) to discontinue at any stage before judgement is 
delivered any such criminal proceedings instituted or undertaken by himself or 
another person or authority.78
The language of §26 does not exclusively reserve to the Attorney General the power to prosecute 
criminal cases.  Further, it would be impossible for the Attorney General to be the sole person 
with the power to initiate criminal proceedings.  For this reason, the Attorney General has 
extended his prosecutorial powers to other bodies such as the National Social Security Fund as 
well as other assistants to aid in dealing with the sheer number of cases that come before him.
 
79  
In fact, the Attorney General has granted prosecutorial powers, albeit in a limited scope, to quite 
a few governmental bodies.  These include the “Kenya Bureau of Standards, the National Health 
Insurance Fund and the Kenya Society for the Prevention of Cruelty against Animals.”80
 
 These 
bodies are all very similar to the KACA in that they have been delegated the power to initiate 
prosecutions within their limited scope of expertise.  Their powers are all contained in a small, 
specialized area of litigation and this power to prosecute not only makes it possible for them to 
carry out their specialized task, but it also aids the Attorney General in relieving that area of 
litigation from his case load – one which  his office would be unable to fully handle alone. 
                                                          
78 CONSTITUTION, Art. 26 (2001) (Kenya). 
79 Nyaga P.N., Prosecution of Corruption Cases in Kenya (July, 2001) (unpublished L.L.B. dissertation, University 
of Nairobi) (on file with author). 
80 Id. 
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It is also true that the exclusive powers vested in the Attorney General by the Constitution do not 
include the exclusive right to prosecute.  Rather this exclusivity only applies to his right to take 
over, continue or terminate criminal proceedings that have already been instituted or undertaken 
by another person or authority.81
 
  If this is the case, then the fact that KACA was initiating its 
own suits, with at least apparent consent from the AG would be perfectly consistent with the 
provisions of the Constitution.  On this view, a violation would only occur if the KACA tried to 
intervene and take over a suit taken by either the Attorney General or a third party citizen or 
organization. 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Gachiengo judicial decision was that once again the 
Judiciary had handed down a decision which gave no weight to the immense fight going on in 
Kenya to try and eradicate or at least minimize corruption.  A government minister noted that 
“[t]he court displayed a shocking ignorance of the policy issues leading to the establishment of 
KACA.”82  In fact, it was apparent that the Gachiengo court did not deem the amendment to The 
Prevention of Corruption Act which established the KACA to be necessary.83
                                                          
81 Id. 
 At this point, this 
anti-corruption law had been in effect for nearly fifty years and amended several times; 
82 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, BACK TO BASICS: LESSONS FROM THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION IN KENYA 
AND SOUTH AFRICA (2001). 
83 The exact language from this case is “We were not addressed as to why the amendment (Legal Notice 10 of 1997 
to the Prevention of Corruption Act which created the KACA) to S.11 of Cap.65 was necessary. In our view we 
found no deficiency in the Act that called for the amendment.”  Stephen Mwai Gachiengo & Albert Muthee Kahuria 
v. Republic from the Republic of Kenya in the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, High Court Miscellaneous 
Application No. 302 of 2000. 
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corruption was still ran rampant, and the government was trying to step up corruption and give 
an anti-corruption agency the teeth that the previous agency did not possess. It seemed hard to 
believe for many that the judicial branch was so unaware of the struggles Kenya was having in 
dealing with corruption that it would deem the KACA an unnecessary institution. Further, the 
Constitutional Court needed not have so far as to eradicate the KACA and leave Kenya without 
an independent anti-corruption agency.   
 
It is argued by John Kithome Tuta in his essay “Evolution of Anti-Corruption Policy and 
Institutional Framework” that the Constitutional Court hearing Gathiengo could have easily 
faulted some provisions of The Prevention of Corruption Act, kept the Act as a whole and the 
KACA as viable means to fight corruption. This would have required presenting Parliament 
some amendment so to Corruption statute so as to bring the KACA within the parameters 
allowed by the Constitution.84
The problems which stemmed from the questionable decision handed down by the 
Constitutional Court in the Gachiengo case were further exacerbated by the Attorney General’s 
decision on December 29, 2000.  On that day, Attorney General, Amos Wako announced that he 
would respect the decision of the court and would therefore not appeal the Gachiengo decision.
  Given the long, difficult battle against corruption in Kenya dating 
back nearly fifty years at that time, it would seem that this method of fine tuning the existing 
anti-corruption mechanics rather than tossing the baby with the bathwater. 
85
                                                          
84 TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA, supra note 28, at 72. 
  
This came as a bit of a surprise, especially given the fact that after the court handed down its 
ruling, the Attorney General made it a point to publically disagree with the court’s decision with 
85 KACA Bills – The Way Forward, K. Mwige, p. 1. 
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regard to the constitutionality of his consent to KACA prosecutions and the question whether or 
not he controlled the KACA prosecutions.86
 
 
Part IV. Fighting Corruption in the Aftermath of the Gachiengo Decision  
 
The demise of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority at the hands of the Constitutional Court was 
met with outrage in the international community. Since the Kenyan government relies heavily on 
international aid, many donors were unwilling to continue funneling aid to Kenya if the 
government did not show that it was dedicated to fighting and eradicating corruption. It very well 
may have been because of donor disapproval that the government under President Daniel Moi, 
which otherwise may have been happy to let the system of patronage and bribery continue, 
enacted further legislation to fight corruption. 
 
One year following, several possible approaches to fill the void the agency left behind by 
KACA’s demise were considered.  Parliament proposed a Constitutional amendment which 
would have amended §26(3)(a) so that it would no longer would be in direct conflict with §11(B) 
of The Prevention of Corruption Act. This would have laid and the constitutionality of the 
KACA to rest.  The amendment would have entrenched the anti-corruption body in the 
Constitution so as to guarantee its continued existence and ensure that it would not be dismantled 
by a corrupt judiciary.87
                                                          
86 KACA Bills – The Way Forward, K. Mwige, p. 1; See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 
 The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment)(No.3) Act, 2001 would have 
achieved that result by giving KACA the power to investigate and institute criminal proceedings 
87 This was finally achieved through the recently passed Constitution.  See infra, “A New Constitution in Kenya” 
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to more than just the Attorney General.  If it had passed, the Attorney General would no longer 
have the exclusive mandate to conduct criminal proceedings.  As such, KACA would have been 
able to criminally charge someone under an anti-corruption law, as well be able to investigate 
and proceed with these cases without needing to have the consent of the Attorney General and 
without worrying about a court declaring that it overstepped its bounds by bringing a corruption-
related case to trial.  However, the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment)(No.3) Act, 2001 was 
never passed by the Kenyan Parliament and, in fact never even passed the Parliamentary vote to 
reach the Third Reading of it.88
 
  
One reason why Parliament accounted for non-passage of this bill was because some Members 
of Parliament thought that there was nothing wrong with the Constitutional Court’s decision in 
Gachiengo.89  In addition, the process of amending the constitution is thought to be a long, 
serious process and arguably should not be done unless absolutely necessary. Since, in the eyes 
of these Parliamentarians, the Constitution of Kenya does in fact allow for the establishment of 
an anti-corruption body with investigative and prosecutorial power, it was, in their view, unwise 
to amend the constitution when it is not actually a roadblock to KACA fighting corruption.  For 
these Parliamentarians, it was the judiciary that was the problem in the anti-corruption agenda.90
 
 
The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment)(No.3) Act, 2001 also faced large-scale opposition in 
the Parliament because many members of Parliament were very opposed to the insertion of an 
                                                          
88 Martin Mutua, Government Shelves, Replaces Graft Bill, EAST AFRICAN STANDARD, Apr. 4, 2003 at 1. 
89 KACA Bills – The Way Forward, K. Mwige, p. 1 
90 KACA Bills – The Way Forward, K. Mwige, p. 1 
30 
 
amnesty clause for those who had engaged in corruption in the past.91  Inclusion of the amnesty 
provision was seen as an attempt by the Moi Government to protect itself from the legal 
ramifications of the corrupt practices engaged in throughout the regime’s history. In opposition 
to this, some Parliamentarians argued that a government truly dedicated to the fight against 
corruption must also maintain a sense of “transitional justice.”92  Transitional justice in this 
context was defined by John Githongo, the former Permanent Secretary of Governance and 
Ethics not as a whitewash of previous crimes, but as taking into account “that past economic 
crimes, especially those that have manifestly impoverished Kenyans need to be addressed in a 
systematic manner as part of a credible process.”93
 
 In other words, a government’s fight against 
corruption does not hold credibility in its own eyes and in those of the public if it does not 
actively prosecute and investigate instances of corruption which may have happened in the past. 
A second avenue the government took in the aftermath of the Gachiengo decision to try and 
prevent Kenya’s anti-corruption infrastructure from crumbling was a new Corruption Control 
Bill.  The Corruption Control Bill was intended to establish the Kenya Corruption Control 
Authority (KCCA).94
                                                          
91 TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA, supra note 28, at 76. This was also a contentious issue with the 
Kenyan public. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, DEALING WITH THE PAST: ECONOMIC CRIMES AND THE 
TRANSITION 14 (2002) [hereinafter ECONOMIC CRIMES AND THE TRANSITION] available at 
http://www.tikenya.org/documents/DealingPast.pdf. 
  This bill attempted to make the KCCA answerable “only to Parliament for 
92Tuta, Control of Corruption in Kenya, supra note 28, at 99. 
93 Id.; See also ECONOMIC CRIMES AND THE TRANSITION, supra note 91, at 14. 
94 Corruption Control Bill, 2001 Part 1(2). 
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the performance of its functions.”95  The bill was an attempt by Parliament to cure the procedural 
and constitutional defects discussed above with regard to the authority of the KACA to 
prosecute.  Under the Corruption Control Bill, the KCCA would have had the power to 
investigate corruption cases and then the Attorney General would institute criminal proceedings 
via public prosecutors previously appointed to the task.96
 
  This bill was eventually passed by 
Parliament in 2002; however it never became law due in large part to the Presidential elections 
taking place that year.  President Kibuki won the election and his NARC party decided not to 
enact the bill, but instead to alter and create a new bill. 
In the interim, as the Parliament struggled to pass new bills related to anti-corruption agencies 
and/or constitutional amendments, the government established the Anti-Corruption Police Unit.97 
The ACPU inherited all the cases the now-defunct KACA had been working on.98
                                                          
95 Corruption Control Bill, Part II (4A)(2) 
  However, 
similar to the former anti-corruption squad established in 1991, the Police Unit did not have 
sufficient resources or a structure to enable it to undertake its tasks effectively.  This is especially 
true because of the questionable legal situation surrounding the ACPU in the wake of the 
judiciary’s decision in the Gachiengo case and Parliament’s inability to pass legislation to 
remedy problems in the Prevention of Corruption Act identified by the Gachiengo decision.  For 
example, an Advisory Board was eventually set up, much like the one KACA had to help give 
advice to the ACPU on how to go about its job of investigating corruption cases.  However, 
unlike the previous Advisory Board for the KACA, this Committee “was largely inactive,” in 
96 Nyaga P.N., supra note 79. 
97 TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA, supra note 28, at 77. 
98 Id. 
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part because there was no legal basis for its existence.99  Another problem with the ACPU was 
that it was less independent from the other branches than was the KACA.   Again, similar to the 
Anti-Corruption squads, the ACPU was headed by the Commissioner of Police and was a part of 
the Kenyan police force and its boss would have to answer to the Director of the Criminal 
Investigations Department.100  Nonetheless, the ACPU managed to do its job surprisingly well 
given its deficiencies and ties to the police force.  It received more complaints than the KACA 
had and filed more reports than the KACA had after following up on these complaints.101
 
 
One of the bigger adverse consequences brought about by the Gachiengo decision is the effect it 
had on all the pending cases that KACA had initiated against corrupt officials. Once KACA was 
stripped of its legal authority for prosecuting corruption, all the cases it was investigating and 
planning to prosecute were handed over to the Attorney General and ACPU.  However, none of 
these cases resulted in a conviction and all were either not prosecuted by the AG or if they were 
prosecuted they were dismissed by the courts. 102  One of the most notable of these cases was that 
of Kipng’eno arap Ng’eny in Republic. v. Attorney-General & Another Ex parte Kipng’eno arap 
Ng’eny.103  Mr. Kipng’eno arap Ng’eny was a very powerful Cabinet Minister who was charged 
by the KACA with high-level or “grand” corruption.104
                                                          
99 Id. 
  Mr. Ng’eny had apparently been corrupt 
for a number of years.  However, it was not until the KACA was created that attempts to hold 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 78-79. 
102 ACPU Annual Report 2002, Nairobi, 2003, p. 11. 
103 Nyaga P.N., supra note 79. 
104 Gathii, Human Rights and Corruption, supra note 16, at 161. 
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him accountable for his graft were made.  The Attorney General finally initiated a prosecution 
against Ng’eny in 2001, after having dragged his feet on this matter for a number of years.105  
However, the High Court issued an order directing the Attorney General not to bring further 
charges against Mr. Ng’eny because of the nine year delay from the time of the corrupt acts and 
the commencement of the suit against him.106
 
  However, this “unexplained” delay can be 
accounted for by the fact that up until the establishment of KACA in 1997, there was no anti-
corruption watchdog going after high-level, corrupt members of the government.  The Ng’eny 
decision signaled the end of KACA and all of its work it had done in fighting corrupt offenders..  
It was quite clear that none of the officials investigated and suspected of corruption by the 
KACA would be brought to justice until a new anti-corruption body was created. 
A) The 2002 Elections and the Rise of the NARC Party 
 
The Presidential elections of 2002 were a very monumental event in the history of Kenya and in 
particular in its fight against corruption.  Newly-elected President Mwai Kibaki of the National 
Rainbow Coalition (“NARC”) was sworn into office, finally drawing to a close the corrupt 
tenure of President Moi as the leader of Kenya.  It also signaled the end of the dominance of the 
KANU party which lost the 2002 election in the face of a united opposition led by Mwai Kibaki.  
Corruption and the people’s desire for a government dedicated to its eradication played a large 
part in determining the results of the election.  One of the main pillars of President Kibaki’s 
candidacy was his denouncement of Moi’s KANU party as corrupt and promises to the people to 
fight and end corruption as a way of life.  To many, his election in 2002 signaled a time of hope 
                                                          
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
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in which government reform would bring about a new way of life in Kenya.107
 
  President Kabaki 
carried over this anti-corruption momentum into office with him and quickly began pushing 
through measures to fight corruption in many different ways. 
President Kibaki first created a new Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs.108  The 
purpose of this position was to coordinate the anti-corruption efforts so as to make them more 
effective and consistent.  In the past, the efforts of the government were often sporadic and 
inconsistent, so much so that they caused international organizations, foreign donors, and critics 
of Kenya’s policies in general to question the level of commitment the previous KANU party 
government had to actually fighting corruption.109  Today, the Ministry’s functions and efforts 
have extended to almost every area of society dealing with corruption including the political 
parties, elections, the Kenya School of Law, and human rights and social justice.110
 
   
Shortly after his arrival in office, President Kibaki also created the position of Permanent 
Secretary in the Office of the President for Governance and Ethics within his Presidential 
Cabinet.  He appointed John Githongo, the former Executive Director of Transparency 
                                                          
107 Gladwell Otieno, The NARC’s Anti-Corruption Drive in Kenya: Somewhere over the Rainbow?, Vol. 14, No. 4 
AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW (2005) available at http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/14No4/EOtieno.htm 
108 Today the branch is called the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion, and Constitutional Affairs.  
http://www.justice.go.ke/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1 
109 See supra, note 40 and text accompanying (discussing how corruption under the Moi administration had become 
so prevalent that nearly all foreign donor aid had been cut off ). 
110 Government of Kenya: Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion, and Constitutional Affairs, 
http://www.justice.go.ke/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1 
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International, Kenya to this post.  Githongo was widely viewed as a well-regarded, trustworthy 
person to head this important position and he came into the office determined to wage war 
against the corruption that has plagued the country for so long. 
 
Part V. The Enactment of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and 
Public Officer Ethics Act 
 
The biggest anti-corruption initiative taken by President Kibaki and his NARC party at the outset 
of his Presidency was the passing of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act as well as 
the Public Officer Ethics Act in May 2003.  Part 1 will examine the framework for the Anti-
Corruption and Economic Crimes Act in depth.  Part 2 will then talk about the Public Officer 
Ethics Act.  Part 3 will discuss the shortcomings of this legislation in practice.   
 
A)  The Enactment of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and its 
Framework 
 
The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (hereinafter “ACECA”) filled the hole left by 
the KACA’s demise following the Kenya Constitutional Court’s Gachiengo decision.111  The 
ACECA established the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (hereinafter “KACC”) as the 
newest corruption fighting body in Kenya.112
                                                          
111 See Supra, “Gachiengo Decision and the Demise of the Kenya Anti Corruption Authority.”  
  The KACC would have to face the same obstacles 
imposed on the KACA by the Constitutional Court’s conclusion in Gachiengo, namely that these 
anti-corruption bodies established through acts of Parliament did not have the explicit power to 
112 Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, (2003) Cap. 65 § 6(1). 
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prosecute anti-corruption crimes under the Constitution of Kenya.  The ACECA did not even 
suggest that the KACC would have the ability to prosecute, probably because Parliament still 
comprised of individuals who had benefitted immensely from corruption in the past.113 Instead, 
the ACECA attempted several methods of ensuring the success and effectiveness of the KACC’s 
anti-corruption efforts while stopping short of granting prosecutorial powers.  For one, ACECA 
gave the Attorney General and the Judicial Branch little unfettered discretion by seeking to hold 
them accountable for any questionable decisions hindering the conviction of the corrupt and the 
fight against corruption in general.114
 
  For example, ACECA gave the KACC very broad powers 
of powers of investigation. The new law also sought to make the Attorney General accountable 
for his decisions on whether or not to prosecute suspects reported to him by the KACC.   
As we shall see below, the extensive investigatory powers of the KACC include the ability “to 
investigate any matter that in the Commission’s opinion, raises suspicion that any of the 
following have occurred or are about to occur --- (i) conduct constituting corruption or economic 
crime; (ii) conduct liable to allow, encourage or cause conduct constituting corruption or 
                                                          
113 The ACECA even defined the KACC as a “body corporate” which is the exact term used by the Constitutional 
Court in its Gachiengo decision to strike down the Prosecutorial Power of the KACA because it was a separate 
entity and not one subservient to the Attorney General.  Compare, §6(1) of the ACECA (“The Kenya Anti-
Corruption Commission is hereby established as a body corporate”) with Stephen Mwai Gachiengo & Albert Muthee 
Kahuria v. Republic from the Republic of Kenya in the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, High Court Miscellaneous 
Application No. 302 of 2000 (“KACA is not a department in the Office of the Attorney General.  It is a body 
corporate . . . . The existence of KACA undermines the power and authority of both the Attorney General and the 
Commissioner of police as conferred on them by the Constitution). 
114 For a discussion of past questionable decisions by the Court impeding the fight against corruption, see Gathii, 
Human Rights and Corruption, supra note 16, at 125. 
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economic crime.”115  The KACC also has the power under the ACECA to investigate the 
conduct of any person,116 branch of the government,117 corporations,118 and local authority,119 
and this list is not exhaustive.  The KACC was also given “all the powers necessary or expedient 
for the performance of its functions,”120 and in the course of carrying out investigations, 
investigators are given the privileges and immunities of police officers.121  The KACC has the 
power to demand, upon reasonable suspicion, a declaration of the suspected person’s property.122 
The purpose for this being that should a person be found in possession of wealth far beyond what 
one would expect given his/her job or upbringing, this may raise suspicion of corruption.    The 
penalty for someone who fails to comply with the KACC’s demand is subject to a fine of up to 
Kshs. 300,000 and/or imprisonment for up to three years.123
                                                          
115 Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, (2003) Cap. 65 §7(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
  In the same vein, the KACC is also 
116 Id. §7(1)(b)  
117 Id. §7(1)(e) (Giving the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission the power “to examine the practices and procedures 
of public bodies in order to facilitate the discovery of corrupt practices.”  “Public bodies” are defined in §2 of the 
ACECA as including “(a) the government, including Cabinet, or any department, service or undertaking of the 
Government; (b) the National Assembly or the Parliamentary Service.” Id. §2(1) 
118 “Public bodies” are further defined in §2 of the ACECA as including also “any corporation, council, board, 
committee or other body which has power to act under and for the purposes of any written law relating to local 
governments, public health or undertakings of public utility or otherwise to administer funds belonging to or granted 
by the Government or money raised by rates, taxes or charges in pursuance of any such law.  Id. 
119 “Public bodies” are further defined in §2 as including “a local authority.”  Id. 
120 Id. §6(2). 
121 Id. §23(3). 
122 Id. §26(1). 
123 Id. §26(2). 
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given the power to demand through notice in writing “any information or documents in the 
person’s possession that relate to a person suspected of corruption or economic crime.”124  The 
KACC can submit their demand for these documents to any person, regardless of whether or not 
they have specifically targeted that person for possible corruption-related offenses.  The same 
goes for requests by the KACC for records in a person’s possession under §28 of the ACECA.  
The penalties for both of these offenses mirror those discussed above; a fine up to Kshs. 300,000 
and/or imprisonment for up to three years.  Furthermore, in situations where those sequestered 
refuse to comply with the KACC’s demands for information, the KACC still has powers to 
uncover the information it may want.  KACC’s investigators can obtain warrants from the courts 
to search for “any record, property or other thing reasonably suspected to be in or on the 
premises and that has not been produced by a person.”125  A final investigatory power conferred 
on the KACC was that the KACC can submit an ex parte application to the court requesting that 
a person who is reasonably suspected of economic crime to be required to hand over their travel 
documents so as to prevent them from fleeing the country.126  This helps the KACC in its 
investigations of corruption because it prevents suspects, evidence, and/or witnesses from 
leaving the country and avoiding the jurisdiction of both the KACC and the court if prosecutions 
are deemed appropriate.  All of the investigative powers discussed above combine to give the 
KACC the ability to get to the bottom of corruption in a variety of ways.127
 
   
                                                          
124 Id. §27(3). 
125 Id. §29(1) 
126 Id. §31(1). 
127 Albeit without the ability to punish those they investigate. 
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However, many of these powers have been challenged as being in conflict with the fundamental 
criminal principle of affording those who are accused the presumption of innocence until proven 
guilty.128  The arguments made here are that KACC has the power to significantly infringe on a 
person’s right and freedoms through a unilateral decision that the person is a corruption suspect.  
In fact, many of KACC’s powers do not require any binding legal determinations by courts 
before it can exercise them.  As discussed above, these rights potentially taken away include the 
right for corruption suspects to leave the country, the right of a person to be free from intrusion 
into their privacy and the right to have their assets kept free of governmental intrusion.  
Furthermore, the suspects can be punished either financially or through imprisonment if they fail 
to comply with the exercise of KACC’s powers.129
 
   
The second aspect of the ACECA which is designed to make certain that the KACC doesn’t 
become a lame duck due to its inability to initiate prosecutions is its system of annual reports it 
and must make to Parliament and the citizens of Kenya.  The KACC is also sought to be kept 
accountable and transparent through §25 of the ACECA.  According to this provision, if the 
KACC chooses not to pursue a complaint, “the Commission shall inform the complainant in 
writing of its decision and of the reasons for its decision.”130
                                                          
128 Under Kenyan law, the Presumption of Innocence principle is found in CONSTITUTION, Art. 77 (2001) (Kenya). 
  This assures the public, in theory, 
that the KACC will not be bribed or take into account political favors, personal relationships, or 
any other outside factors when determining what cases it will recommend to the Attorney 
General for the institution of formal legal proceedings.   
129 Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act 
130 Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, (2003) Cap. 65 §25 (emphasis added). 
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The ACECA also sets out to bring a level of accountability and transparency to the prosecutorial 
decisions the Attorney General makes as well.  The KACC is given the task of preparing 
quarterly reports which “set[] out the number of reports made to the Attorney General . . . and 
[these reports] shall indicate if a recommendation of the Commission to prosecute a person for 
corruption or economic crime was not accepted [by the Attorney General].”131  In conjunction 
with this, the Attorney General has the responsibility of preparing his own annual reports.132 The 
Attorney General’s reports should set out the steps he took during the course of the year,133 and 
any recommendations made by the KACC that were not accepted.  The AG must lay out 
“succinctly the reasons for not accepting the recommendations.”134  Both of these reports, (that 
of the KACC and of the AG), must be submitted to the National Assembly.135  Furthermore, the 
report of the KACC must be submitted to the Gazette for publication to the general public.136
                                                          
131 Id. §§36(1)-36(2). 
  
This system of reporting is based on at least two main ideas about how to bring about neutrality 
and accountability to the process of bringing about prosecutions for corruption.  One being that, 
with both bodies submitting reports they will both prevent one body from misleading Parliament 
and the public about their role in combating corruption.  Secondly, if the Attorney General 
continues to drag his feet with regard to bringing corruption suspects into court, there will be 
more concrete proof available to both the government and the public to determine whether he is 
indeed impeding the country’s fight against corruption.  The same goes for the court system, if 
132 Id. §37. 
133 Id. §37(3). 
134 Id. §37(4). 
135 Id. §36.4 & §37(6). 
136 Id. §36(5). 
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the courts continue to throw out corruption cases, it will be more widely known and documented 
exactly which part of the government is dragging its feet in addressing corruption. 
 
The ACECA also provided for the appointment of special magistrates for hearing corruption 
cases.137  These magistrates are responsible for the trying of “any offense punishable under [The 
Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act]”138 as well as any conspiracy to commit these 
activities labeled a crime under the ACECA.139  Since then an anti-corruption court has been 
established.140
 
 
The foregoing provisions of the ACECA were all written to remedy the defects of previous anti-
corruption legislation and to try and improve on and learn from the past mistakes made.   The 
anti-corruption framework laid down by the ACECA is the most comprehensive to date.  
However there are still many criticisms of this framework.  The next step is to look at some of 
the negative claims made about the ACECA and KACC at the time of their commencement and 
whether these alleged defects have caused problems in practice.  However, before engaging in 
that evaluation, another important piece of legislation that also came into effect in 2003 will be 
discussed. 
                                                          
137 Id. §3. 
138 Id. §3(a). 
139 Id. §3(b). 
140 “The Anti-Corruption Court specifically handles matters dealing with graft in public and private office . . . . Anti-
Corruption Courts are located across the country in areas such as Nairobi, Kiambu, Nyeri, and Kisumu.  The 
Republic of Kenya, Judiciary, Court Structure, 
http://www.judiciary.go.ke/judiciary/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=289&Itemid=407. 
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B) The Enactment of the Public Officer Ethics Bill 
 
The Public Officer Ethics Bill was the first of its type in Kenya.  Its purpose was different from 
earlier pieces of anti-corruption legislation passed by the Kenyan Parliament.  The purpose of 
this law was “to advance the ethics of public officers by providing for a Code of Conduct and 
Ethics for public officers.”141  This was part of the broad anti-corruption strategy the NARC 
government wanted to instill after President Kibaki came into power.  Up until this point, anti-
corruption legislation had taken the form of merely defining corrupt behavior and determining 
how severely to punish each type of behavior it defines as corrupt.142
                                                          
141 Public Officer Ethics Act, (2003) Cap. 183 Preamble.  Furthermore, the bill was stated as being intended to 
“define the basic values, principles and set boundaries of acceptable behavior[]r by public officials in this country 
(Kenya). We also hope to provide a legal framework for restoring public confidence in our Civil Service.” Kenya, 
The National Assembly, Debates on the Public Officer Ethics Bill, March 13, 2003, col. 446 (statement by Mr. 
Murungi, Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs). 
 However, contemporary 
142 This is the case for all the legislation discussed so far.  The Prevention of Corruption Act defined the type of 
behavior in the civil service which would was illegal and would be punished under the act.  See supra, “The passing 
of the Prevention of Corruption Bill.”  The purpose of the bill was to make nearly certain that those who engage in 
corruption would be caught.  Id. The same goes for the proposed Corruption Control Bill which sought to create 
another anti-corruption investigatory/prosecutorial body to root out those who were corrupt.  See supra “Fighting 
Corruption in the Aftermath of the Gachiengo Decision.”  Also, the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 
2003 went about fighting corruption in the same manner by creating the KACC and further defining and elaborating 
what exactly defines corruption.  See supra “The Enactment of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and 
its framework.” 
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attitudes about corruption and how to fight it had begun to shift.143
 
 The realization that for the 
fight against corruption to be successful, a government would have to do more than create an all-
encompassing definition of corruption and a body to investigate and enforce it was gaining 
currency.  While defining and investigating corruption are both integral parts of the fight against 
corruption, when they are supplemented by other reform efforts a much greater effect is possible.  
This is where the Public Officer Ethics Act, 2003 comes into play.  By promoting 
professionalism and integrity in the public service through a code of conduct and model 
standards rather than by threat of punishment, the Public Officer Ethics Act was implemented to 
help curb corruption in a different way.  This will in turn help the KACC fight corruption since 
even the greatest of investigatory bodies will not successfully uncover all cases of corruption. 
Some of these “supplemental” measures include educating the public on corruption and its 
effects.  
The Public Officer Ethics Act, (POEA), created a general Code of Conduct and Ethics.  This 
code of conduct sets out a number of provisions for the members of the public service to follow.  
A public officer is to “carry out his duties and ensure that the services that s/he provides are 
provided efficiently and honestly.”144
                                                          
143 Gathii, supra note 16, at 126-29.  The IMF for example emphasized more than just the definition/investigation 
approach to fighting anti-corruption, but instead stressed “the importance of promoting good governance in all its 
aspects” including, among other things, “improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector.”  Press 
Release, IMF Interim Committee, Interim Committee Declaration on Partnership for Sustainable Global Growth 
(Sept. 29, 1996) available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/dec.pdf (emphasis added). 
  The Public Officer Ethics Act requires very specific 
144 Public Officer Ethics Act, (2003) Cap. 183 §8. 
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standards to be followed including treating others with courtesy and respect;145 taking no 
unwarranted absences;146 proper hygiene and dress;147 avoidance of conflicts of interest in the 
discharge of their duties;148 refraining from using their office as a means for personal 
enrichment;149 and following the rule of law in the discharge of their duties.150  This list is not 
all-inclusive, the POEA lists a vast array of standards and responsibilities the public officials are 
expected to comply with.151  This specific Code of Conduct and Ethics applies to public officials 
until a more specialized Commission passed through their own Code of Conduct for their 
relevant subsection of the Public Service.152 These specialized commissions have the authority to 
go beyond the standards laid out in the general Code of Conduct and Ethics, however they are 
not allowed to create a more lenient Code.153
 
   
The commissions are given the power to investigate whether a person has violated a portion of 
the Code of Conduct either at its own initiative or upon receiving a complaint from a third 
                                                          
145 Id. §9(b) 
146 Id. §9(e) 
147 Id. §9(f) 
148 Id. §12. 
149 Id. §11.  
150 Id. §10. 
151 The full listing of duties and responsibilities spans from §§8 – 31. 
152 Id. §5(4).  These specialized commissions are numerous and nearly all-encompassing.  They include 
commissions for the National Assembly, electoral commission, controller and auditor-general, public officers, 
judges and magistrates, teachers, members of the armed forces, members of the National Security Intelligence 
Service, as well as a catch-all for public officials who don’t fit within any other category.  Id. §§3(2) – 3(11). 
153 Id. §5(2) 
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party.154  If the relevant commission determines that a violation has occurred, it has the power to 
issue an appropriate punishment,155
 
 or refer the matter to another body that has the power to 
issue an appropriate punishment. 
The POEA further requires that all Public Service Members issue an annual declaration of their 
wealth as well as that of their families.156  The reports must also be given within thirty days of 
becoming a public officer157and within thirty days of ceasing to be a public officer.158  The 
POEA delegates to the relevant commissions the power to demand a clarification of a person’s 
wealth report if the figures are not completely disclosed or if something is omitted.159  President 
Kibaki himself submitted a declaration of his own wealth at the beginning of his Presidency in an 
effort to convince all of those who work in the Kenyan government to follow suit.160
                                                          
154 Id. §§35(1) – 35(2).  
   
155 Id. §36(1) (a).  It is interesting to note the broad powers given to these commissions under the POEA.  They are 
given Legislative power through their power to enact the Code of Conduct for their particular sector.  See supra note 
152 and accompanying text. While there are guidelines they must follow, even these can be added on to by the 
Commission or even defined further and clarified if need be under §5(2)(b) (stating that the Commission may “set 
out how any requirements of the specific or general Code may be satisfied”).  The Commissions are also given 
judicial powers in that they can investigate and punish those found in violation of the Code they themselves created.  
Public Officer Ethics Act, (2003) Cap. 183 §36(1)(a). 
156 Public Officer Ethics Act, (2003) Cap. 183 §26(1) 
157 Id. §27(3) 
158 Id. §27(5), 
159 Id. §28. 
160 Kenya President Declares his Wealth, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2003, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/30/world/world-breriefing-africa-kenya-president-declares-his-wealth.html 
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These mandatory declarations of wealth have raised another constitutional issue in relation to the 
right to privacy.  The argument here is that a mandatory duty to disclose the assets and wealth of 
oneself and one’s spouse and children are certainly in conflicts with the right to privacy.  
However, the right to privacy is not explicitly laid out by the Constitution of Kenya, although it 
has been determined to be an implicit right that still warrants protection.161
 
   
Many of the issues addressed by the Public Officer Ethics Act have been recurring issues in 
Kenya and go as far back as the first debates over the Prevention of Corruption Act.  For 
instance, §11(3) of the Public Officer Ethics Act declares that “[a] public officer may accept a 
gift given to him in his official capacity but, unless the gift is a non-monetary gift that does not 
exceed the value prescribed by regulation, such a gift shall be deemed to be a gift to the public 
officer’s [organization].” Legislators were still debating this issue over whether public officials 
should be allowed to accept gifts from constituents or members of the general public as the law 
worked its way through Parliament.162
                                                          
161 The right to privacy is applied in Kenyan law through its presence in the English Common Law. Anne Kiunuhe, 
Kenya Urgently Needs Privacy Protection Laws, BUSINESS DAILY AFRICA, August 3, 2010.  Available at 
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Opinion%20&%20Analysis/Kenya%20urgently%20needs%20privacy%20prot
ection%20laws/-/539548/969588/-/view/printVersion/-/l0esy0/-/index.html 
  As we saw earlier in this chapter, the definition of what 
162 See e.g., Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Public Officer Ethics Bill, March 13, 2003, col. 448 
(statement by Mr. Murungi, The Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs) (stating that gifts are “[p]re-emptive 
corruption” and that allowing public officeers to accept these types of gifts is preparing them to be corrupt in the 
future when the favor is called in); see also, Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Public Officer Ethics 
Bill, March 18, 2003, col. 493 (statement by Mr. Kipchumba) (discussing that what is a valuable gift is subjective 
based on a person’s relative wealth). 
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constitutes a gift and whether public officials are allowed to accept gifts was an issue in the very 
first anti-corruption legislation.163
 
   
Another long-debated issue addressed by the Public Officer Ethics Act is the problem of 
harambees.164  In this context, a harambee is a Kenyan practice of public fundraising where a 
public official, community leader, business person, or government representative presides over a 
public meeting to collect money from a community to help fund communal projects or to raise 
money for those in need. However, over time harambees became a vehicle for corruption, with 
political leaders using the collected communal funds for their own gain or for unacceptable 
purposes.  Against this backdrop, members of Parliament debated at length whether the practice 
of harambee should be made illegal because although it had noble goals, it had become an 
institution of corruption in practice.165
                                                          
163 See supra, notes 20-27 and accompanying text. 
  The issue of harambees had also come up previously in 
164 Public Officer Ethics Act, §11(1) (A public officer shall not preside over a harambee, play a central role in its 
organization or play the role of “guest of honour.”). 
165 Compare, Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Public Officer Ethics Bill, March 20, 2003, col. 579 
(statement by Mr. Muchiri) (“It is important that we are not stopped from holding Harambees . . . Harambee is there 
to stay but in a properly regulated manner”) with Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Public Officer 
Ethics Bill, March 13, 2003, col. 450 (statement by Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs Mr. Murungi) 
(comparing Kenya with other, more developed African countries such as Tanzania and Uganda where there no 
longer is the practice of Harambee and recommending that it is time to move towards more organized and modern 
endowment and charity systems rather than the old system of Harambee.) 
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earlier debates with regard to the intention of the gift giver in determining whether corruption 
was taking place.166
 
  
Another important issue with the Public Officer Ethics Act was whether the declarations of 
wealth required by the Act should be kept confidential or made available to the general public so 
as to encourage transparency in the government.  This was a topic much debated while the bill 
was making its way through the Legislature.167  Many Ministers were opposed to having the 
declarations of wealth made available to the public.168
                                                          
166 Supra text accompanying notes 22-29.  This issue came up in that Harambee donations, just like other gifts, are 
given to politicians without any idea about whether this contribution was made with the purpose of trying to procure 
a return favor later on from the public or community official. Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the 
Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill, Oct. 19, 1967, col. 964 (statement by Mr. Wariithi). 
  However, many commentators expressed 
167 Compare, Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Public Officer Ethics Bill, March 13, 2003, col. 456 
(statement by Mr. M. Kariuki) (“I believe that the purpose of making public officers accountable [through the 
declaration of wealth] is to ensure that members of the public are informed about what they have acquired 
unlawfully) with Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Public Officer Ethics Bill, March 18, 2003, col. 
494 (statement by Mr. Kipchumba) (fearing that a declaration of wealth provision which is made public will scare 
people out of the ministry because of fears about their privacy). 
168 Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Public Officer Ethics Bill, March 18, 2003, col. 494 (statement 
by Mr. Kipchumba) (fearing that a declaration of wealth provision which is made public will scare people out of the 
ministry because of fears about their privacy also discussing how Kenyan society is by nature more secretive about 
wealth and assets); Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Public Officer Ethics Bill, March 19, 2003, col. 
546-47 (statement by Mr. M. Kilonzo) (fearing possible incidences resulting from the public officers’ declarations 
being made available to the public).  See also, Revise the Ethics Bill or We Reject it, Members Demand, DAILY 
NATION, Mar. 20, 2003 (saying that members of the Parliament were concerned that declaring their wealth would 
leave them vulnerable to kidnappings and extortion). 
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the view that it was vital that the declarations be made public.169  The final product of the POEA 
made these declarations confidential.170  However, even this was not without controversy as 
some MPs were moving for an amendment to this section not long after its enactment.171
 
   
Another divisive issue in passing the Public Officer Ethics Act is the issue over which public 
service members the act applies to.  Some have argued that the POEA was discriminatory 
because it targets only relatively higher-ranking public service members as having to declare 
their wealth, whereas lower level clerks and constables are not required to declare their 
wealth.172
 
  This does not seem to be in keeping with the general findings on corruption in Kenya.  
In many cases, public official corruption occurs in large part because they require bribes to get 
by and are unable to do so solely upon their relatively small salaries.  This is often the case with 
teachers for example, who are not given adequate compensation without seeking supplemental 
income from bribes or alternative income such as from running businesses.   
                                                          
169 Kenneth Mwige, Declared Assets Must be Open to Public Scrutiny, EAST AFRICAN STANDARD, Mar. 25, 2003 
(arguing that upon entering into public service, he/she becomes “a servant of the public” and therefore has the duty 
to report wealth). 
170 Public Officer Ethics Act, Section 30(1); See also, Njeri Rugene, MPs Conclude Ethics Bill Amid Controversy, 
DAILY NATION, Mar. 23, 2003 (“Section [30] of the Bill provides that the Commission keeps this information 
confidential . . . .”). 
171 Njeri Rugene, MPs Conclude Ethics Bill Amid Controversy, DAILY NATION, Mar. 23, 2003 at 2(“[h]owever, the 
committee on Justice and Legal Affairs chaired by Kabete MP Paul Muite has given intention to amend the two 
sections to provide that the confidentiality requirement be done away with.”) 
172 Id. at 1.  
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C) Supposed Defects in the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and their 
effect on the Act in Practice 
 
The first criticism of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act was that despite all its 
efforts to give the KACC real power to fight corruption, these efforts would all be insufficient 
without vesting in it some sort of prosecutorial power as well.  This criticism goes back to the 
failed history of the KACA.  The Attorney General’s office has long dragged its feet and been 
unwilling to prosecute corruption cases recommended to it by the anti-corruption bodies it 
supposedly worked in concert with.173  Because of this, it was a widely held view that without 
entrenching the KACC in the Constitution or legally granting it prosecutorial powers through 
other means, the body would eventually become a lame duck to investigate corruption cases 
which would inevitably die out on the desk of the Attorney General.174
 
   
                                                          
173 See, Donald Deya, Kenya Killing the East African Dream, Again, Mars Group Kenya Blog, March 26, 2007 
available at http://blog.marsgroupkenya.org/?p=25; see also Walter Menya, AG, Police Faulted for Derailing 
Mwakwere Arrest, DAILY NATION, Aug. 17, 2010 (“The National Cohesion and Integration Commission on Tuesday 
faulted AG Amos Wako’s office and Matthew Iteere’s police of failing to act on its recommendations to arrest Mr. 
Mwakwere . . . .  Attorney General Amos Wako termed the allegations as false and without foundation.”) available 
at http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/978264/-/wbcldp/-/index.html. 
174 Good Start, but More Needs to be Done, DAILY NATION, March 27, 2009 (“KACC is a lame duck.  Although, as 
the PM has noted, it has conducted several graft investigations, just a few have been conclusively dealt with by the 
courts.  The perennial problem of missing files at the courts, the delays in handling cases, questionable rulings, and 
unholy cartels of lawyers and judges have conspired to frustrate the rule of law.”); see also Bernard Namunane, 
Kenya: AG Fails to Act on 36 Corruption Cases, AllAfrica.com, Nov. 19, 2004. 
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This criticism is most vivid in light of the Anglo-Leasing Scandal, possibly the most grand-scale 
corruption scandal ever to have taken place in Kenya under Presidents Daniel Arap Moi and 
Mwai Kibaki.  The Anglo-Leasing Scandal involved eighteen security-related contracts the 
Kenyan Government entered into during both the Moi and Kibaki Presidencies.175 In all, it has 
been estimated that the government had entered into questionable contracts in which it agreed to 
pay Kshs. 56.3 billion.176  The contracts were questionable because the Kenyan government 
either grossly overpaid for the goods it requested or even because it contracted with companies 
that turned out to be non-existent and never delivered on the services they were paid for.177  Even 
worse, the payments could not be revoked on the grounds that the companies did not perform 
their obligations because the Kenyan government issued their money in the form of irrevocable 
promissory notes.178
 
 
This scandal was uncovered by a senior government official, John Githongo.179  He revealed in 
his report (“Githongo Report”) in extensive detail that some high-level government officials had 
perpetrated this scheme.180
                                                          
175 MARS GROUP KENYA, ILLEGALLY BINDING: THE MISSING ANGLO LEASING SCANDAL PROMISSORY NOTES 12 
(2007) [hereinafter ILLEGALLY BINDING]. 
  The government officials had used their positions in government to 
176 Id. at 13. 
177 Such as Anglo Leasing and Financing Limited, the company the scandal has been named for.  Id. 
178 Id. at notes 39-40. 
179 Steve Bloomfield, Report Reveals Scale of Corruption in Kenya, The Independent U.K., Sept. 1, 2007, available 
at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/report-reveals-scale-of-corruption-in-kenya-401113.html; 
Githongo’s position was created by the NARC government upon President Kibaki’s inauguration. See Supra “The 
2002 Election and the Rise of the NARC Party.”   
180 JOHN GITHONGO, GITHONGO REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (2005). 
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enter contracts on behalf of the government with fictitious companies. These contracts were paid 
out by the government over a period of years and the amount spent was in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars.  In return the government received either nothing or vastly inadequate 
services in relation to the amount the Kenyan government paid.  Furthermore, because the 
contracts were generally security-related, military contracts, the scheme was even more 
airtight.181  The government could contract out for exorbitant sums without disclosing what 
exactly they were getting and without any checks or balances on whether they were paying a fair 
price because the matters were related to national security.182  Through these contracts, they 
embezzled enormous amounts of government money for personal gain.  Githongo’s report 
revealed many high-level officials with whom he had incriminating conversations with regarding 
their involvement in the scheme and their desire for him to stop investigating them.183  Within 
the Kibaki Presidency, these high-level officials included the then Vice President Moody Awori, 
the Attorney General Amos Wako, the Finance Minister David Mwiriria, the Energy Minister 
Kiraitu Murungi, Minister for Internal Security Chirs Murungaru, head of the KACC Aaron 
Ringera and even the President himself Mwau Kibaki.184
                                                          
181 MICHELA WRONG, IT’S OUR TURN TO EAT: THE STORY OF A KENYAN WHISTLEBLOWER 168—70 (2009). 
 
182 Id. 
183 See GITHONGO, supra note 180.  For an in depth discussion on this see WRONG, supra note 181 (discussing the 
effect tribal allegiances have in justifying this sort of grand corruption in the minds of the ruling elite). 
184 See generally, GITHONGO, supra note 180.  Although Githongo’s report was addressed to President Kibaki and 
did not explicitly implicate any suspicious conversation he had with the President as it did other Ministers, the 
President’s general statements advising Githongo to hold off on reporting these conversations along with the 
President’s subsequent actions that seemingly implicate the President and are the reasons for many commentators 
strongly believing that the President is involved; see also WRONG, supra note 181.  
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There were great expectations that the NARC government was going to be clean and corruption-
free unlike its predecessor,185
The investigations into the Anglo Leasing Scandal and the futile effort to bring those responsible 
to justice show an inherent weakness in the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission and why it 
could not be effective in its fight against corruption on its own.  Even though it has been granted 
broad investigatory powers, 
 however the Anglo Leasing Scandal and the report by Githongo 
tarnished the image of the NARC regime.  It was due to this scandal that the Kenyan people and 
the rest of the world began to realize that the NARC government was not the answer to 
corruption that it had proclaimed itself to be and that the world had expected it to be.  The anti-
corruption platform which had vaulted Kibaki into the Presidency appeared to lack sincerity as 
the government has showed no commitment at all to the anti-corruption agenda.  Nearly every 
Minister in the Kibaki Presidency was incriminated by the Githongo Report.   
 
186 the KACC did not discover any evidence of this grand corruption 
until Githongo made his report public.  In addition, the actions of the Attorney General strongly 
suggest that he was at least complicit in the scandal, if not actively involved in its cover up 
which prevented the scandal from being exposed, investigated, and its perpetrators prosecuted.187
                                                          
185 See supra, “The 2002 Elections and the Rise of the NARC Party” 
  
186 See supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text. 
187 These allegations have come about for a variety of reasons. (1) The contract terms the AG agreed to were very 
disadvantageous to his government of Kenya; (2) The AG justified the contracts by claiming he was merely acting 
as an assurance for investors (such as Anglo Leasing and Finances Ltd.) rather than as a protector of the Kenyan 
people; (3) The AG signed the notes without giving the Kenyan Parliament the chance to accept and scrutinize the 
contracts claiming that Parliament’s acceptance and scrutiny was not required because they were rental agreements 
and not a form of loan or credit.  ILLEGALLY BINDING, supra note 175,  at 38 – 40 
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As discussed above, without the AG working in concert with the KACC it becomes a lame duck, 
incapable of curbing corruption in Kenya.188  Here, the Attorney General and the Judicial Branch 
hindered any attempts to investigate in a number of different ways.189  The Attorney General 
allowed the government to pay for the corrupt contracts via promissory notes.190
 
  The negative 
effects of this were twofold.  First, the government was bound to pay the contracts because the 
promissory notes could not be revoked, and second, this hindered the KACC’s ability to find out 
who was behind the scheme and the fictitious companies because promissory notes can change 
hands numerous times as they are traded on the open market.   
The judicial branch has at times rendered the KACC powerless to effectively fight corruption.  In 
one instance the KACC was prohibited from investigating Nedemar Technologies BV, one of the 
companies that received an “Anglo-leasing” contract.  The court in that case refused to allow the 
KACC to investigate into a contract entered into by the Attorney General before the KACC had 
come into being.191
                                                          
188 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.. 
  In another instance the KACC’s investigations into Globetel Incorporated 
189 “Justice Ringera laid the blame squarely on AG Amos Wako and the Judiciary, whom he accused of blocking 
every route KACC has taken to deal with the key players. ‘The decisions from some of the courts have questioned 
the Commission’s powers in exercise of its investigatory mandate and stopped the Commission in its tracks from 
continuing investigations into mega-scandals like the Anglo-[L]easing contracts.’” David Okwembah, Is this the 
End of Anglo-Leasing Investigations? DAILY NATION, July 8, 2009; see also, KACC Accuses Attorney General of 
Frustrating Graft War, THE STANDARD (stating the opinion of many within the KACC that it is a lame dog without 
prosecutorial power). 
190 ILLEGALLY BINDING, supra note 175, at 38.  Promissory notes are by definition binding upon the party signing 
them and are a legal tender which can be bought and traded on the open market. 
191 David Okwembah, Is this the End of the Anglo-Leasing Investigations? DAILY NATION, July 8, 2009. 
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and First Mercantile Securities Corp. were not stymied by a court decision, but were certainly 
hindered.192  The Kenyan court in that case ruled that the KACC could not use any information 
received from the mutual legal assistance of a foreign jurisdiction.193
 
 
A second criticism of the KACC is that its corruption-fighting powers were still not entrenched 
in the Kenyan Constitution.  This was a problem that the KACA also faced during its time as the 
anti-corruption body.194  The Gachiengo decision could have been prevented had the KACA 
been given a constitutional mandate.  As we saw above, this was one of the proposed methods 
for reviving the KACA after Gachiengo stripped it of all of its powers.195  While KACC has so 
far survived constitutional scrutiny unlike KACA, the lack of a constitutional foundation has still 
left doubts regarding its powers.  For instance, the power of the KACA to require those 
suspected of wrongdoing to declare their property has been questioned for its constitutional 
legitimacy.196  Sections twenty-six, twenty-seven, and twenty-eight of the Anti-Corruption and 
Economic Crimes Act all deal with this power the KACC has to require suspects to declare their 
property.  When Dr. Christopher Ndarathi Murungaru was the subject of one of these requests by 
the KACC, he like many others immediately went to the court to challenge the constitutionality 
of the KACC’s actions.197
                                                          
192 Id. 
  The defendant challenged the action by the KACC as being 
193 Id. 
194 See supra, “Gachiengo Decision and the Demise of the Kenyan Anti-Corruption Authority” 
195 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
196 Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, §26(1).   
197 Christopher Ndarathi Murungaru v. Kenyan Anti-Corruption Commission & another. Misc Civ. App. 54 of 2006.  
See also, Allan N. Ngugi, Statement of the Advisory Board of the Anti-Corruption Commission with Reference to 
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unconstitutional because it was in violation of the presumption of innocence and in his view had 
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant to prove that his property wasn’t illegally obtained 
through corrupt activities.198  The defendant further argued that the provisions were in violation 
of his constitutional right against self-incrimination and the right to silence.  Defendant 
Murungaru also argued that the KACC prosecution was “inhumane, demeaning, and degrading 
treatment in contravention of Section 74(1) of the Constitution.”199  The Court found that the 
actions of the KACC were not in violation of the Constitution,200
 
 although, it is a perfect 
example of the endless litigation the KACC has had to endure in defending its rights and 
methods for fighting corruption. 
This decision seems to depart from some of the other decisions of the Kenyan judiciary in that it 
seems to take into account the corruption epidemic, the long fight against corruption, and the fact 
that it is still widespread in Kenya.  Past decisions by the Judiciary had the effect of doing away 
with vital anti-corruption resources on tenuous and minute procedural grounds.201
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Powers of the Commission for Detection and Investigation of Corruption and Economic Crimes in 26, 27, and 
28 of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act 2003 (2007). 
 The 
Murungaru decision seemed to recognize the importance of the KACC in the fight against 
198 Christopher Ndarathi Murungaru v. Kenyan Anti-Corruption Commission & another. Misc Civ. App. 54 of 2006 
page 10-11. 
199 Christopher Ndarathi Murungaru v. Kenyan Anti-Corruption Commission & another. Misc Civ. App. 54 of 2006 
page 11.  Other provisions of the Constitution which Murungaru alleged were violated were 70(a), 70(c), 77(2)(a), 
76(c), 77(7), 82, section 77(1) and 77(9) dealing with fair trial and fair hearing, section 82(1) and 82(2) dealing with 
selectively and discriminately enforcing the ACECA/ 
200 Christopher Ndarathi Murungaru v. Kenyan Anti-Corruption Commission & another. Misc Civ. App. 54 of 2006. 
201 See generally, Gathii, Human Rights and Corruption, supra note 16. 
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corruption and therefore defended it from some of the procedural attacks which had been 
effective in stymieing anti-corruption efforts in the past.202
 
 
Part VI. The Fight against Corruption Today 
  
In this section I will look at more recent events, both successes and failures, in the fight against 
corruption and the initiatives the government is still unveiling to try and win the war against 
corruption in Kenya.   
 
To try to solve the problems inherent with not having the body entrenched in the Constitution the 
Kenyan government drafted a Revised Harmonized Draft Constitution at the end of 2009.  Under 
this Draft Constitution, a committee of experts proposed to firmly establish the constitutionality 
of the KACC by having it expressly provided for in the Constitution.  The clause would have 
empowered the KACC to combat corruption without such judicial challenges.  The Anti-
Corruption Commission would have been granted powers to force the declaration of property.  
This would have immunized the KACC from judicial challenges.203
 
  
The Integrity Commission would still not have had prosecutorial powers under the Harmonized 
Draft Constitution.  However, there were provisions in place to protect its investigations from 
being undermined by the Attorney General’s powers.  Under the Harmonized Draft Constitution, 
Chapter 12, Section 193, the Attorney General was to serve a six year term, at the end of which 
                                                          
202 See e.g. the Gachiengo decision, decision allowing the bribe giver to escape using alibi. 
203 See supra, note 286 and accompanying text. 
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he is not eligible for reappointment.204
 
  This was very likely in response to the enduring term of 
Amos Wako as Attorney General.  Wako has served in this position since 1991, and is criticized 
by many for his unwillingness to prosecute corruption cases brought to his desk.  An 
uncooperative Attorney General under such an amendment would no longer have free reign to 
prevent progress in the fight of corruption and justice indefinitely.  However, the Revised 
Harmonized Draft Constitution of March 2010 dropped the Integrity Commission over 
objections by the Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution.  The Parliamentarians, in 
dropping the provision, demonstrated once again their lack of commitment to removing the legal 
and constitutional impediments that previously frustrated the effectiveness of the anti-corruption 
agenda in Kenya.  The Revised Harmonized Draft Constitution however made provision for an 
independent anti-corruption agency.  It contemplated that the power of the Attorney General in 
conducting prosecutions was not absolute. 
Another proposal to try to give the fight greater efficiency and effectiveness was the Anti-
Corruption and Economic Crimes (Repeal) Act.205
                                                          
204 REVISED HARMONIZED DRAFT CONSTITUTION, C. 12, s. 193, part 4(9).  “The Attorney-General shall hold office 
for a term of six years and shall 
not be eligible for re-appointment.” 
  This proposed Act would dissolve the KACC 
and make it a part of the office of the Attorney General.  However, this law would have been 
much less advantageous to the fight against corruption than the Harmonized and Revised 
Harmonized Draft Constitutions.  After all, the anti-corruption agenda has been impeded by the 
205 See Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission may be Disbanded, PAN-AFRICAN NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 3, 2009; John 
Ngirachu, New Bill to Dissolve KACC Bill to Make AG’s Office One-Stop Shop for Cases on Corruption, DAILY 
NATION, Oct. 15, 2009. 
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AG’s office much more than by the KACC.  The KACC has submitted numerous cases that it 
has investigated to the Attorney General’s office that have died upon his desk.  Repealing the 
ACECA would therefore not be much of a solution at all.  Under this proposal, the AG’s office, 
historically inept at fighting corruption, would be the sole coordinator for anti-corruption efforts.  
The repeal would therefore be a huge step backwards.  Being independent and removed from the 
external, political pressure that the branches of government can apply would make it possible for 
the anti-corruption agenda to be more effective.  Placing the corruption agency back under the 
supervision and control of the government would by contrast lead to the paralysis and 
manipulation that has frustrated the agenda so far.  
 
Keeping the KACC impartial is especially important given the recent resignation by the head of 
the body, Aaron Ringera.  On 30th September 2009, Ringera, the resigned from his post as anti-
corruption chief.  Ringera had been head of the KACC and the now-defunct KACA since 1999.  
His reappointment by President Kibaki in 2009 was the subject of much controversy and 
eventually led to Ringera’s resignation.  The issue with his reappointment was the manner in 
which it was accomplished.  §(9)(3) of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act provides 
that the Kenya Anti-Corruption Advisory Board (KAACB) will nominate a candidate for any 
vacancy in the position of Director.  This nominee will need to pass a vote in the National 
Assembly at which point the President will appoint this person to the position.206
                                                          
206 Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, §(9)(4). 
  In Ringera’s 
reappointment, however, President Kibaki bypassed both the process of nomination by the 
KACCAB and the ratification of the nomination by the National Assembly and unilaterally 
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retained Ringera in Office.207  This move by Kibaki was controversial and for the first time, the 
National Assembly vetoed a Presidential order.208  While some commentators admitted that 
Ringera was still highly qualified for the job and remained the best candidate for the job,209 
many felt that he had failed in his job to help reduce and (ideally) eradicate corruption in 
Kenya.210
 
   
Whether or not Ringera had done his job or not however is a more complicated issue than just 
looking at the results of the fight against corruption under his watch.  The KACC had to deal 
with a government where all three branches tainted with corruption, an Attorney General 
unwilling to go after those responsible, apparent high-level cover ups of grand-scale corruption, 
and a public sector which has treated corruption as a way of life.  Clearly Ringera had not done 
all he could do to rid the country of corruption.  The fact that President Kibaki and his 
administration, as tainted with corruption as it was, valued Ringera’s service and desired him to 
remain in office is damning in and of itself.  This is a large reason why, with a new head to the 
KACC just beginning his term as chief in the fight against corruption, it is important that his 
tenure is not influenced from the start by external, corrupting pressures. 
 
                                                          
207 Roseleen Nzioka, Ringera Resigns from KACC, THE STANDARD, Sept. 30, 2009. 
208 The Row over Aaron Ringera, AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, Sept. 25, 2009. 
209 Justice Aaron Ringera Re-Appointment at KACC not a Surprise, A POLITICAL KENYA IN 2010; see also text 
accompanying footnotes 61-63. 
210 Xan Rice, Head of Kenya’s Anti-Corruption Commission to Resign, THE GUARDIAN U.K., September 30, 2009. 
(“Retired judge Aaron Ringera, whose £20,000 a month salary made him the top-paid civil servant, is widely viewed 
as having failed to tackle high-level graft and to recover hundreds of millions of pounds in looted funds.”). 
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The new head of the KACC position –leading Nairobi lawyer Patrick Lumumba - is also 
especially important because of the recent regression in the fight against corruption in the past 
several years. One such example is the passage of two amendments to the ACECA that put a halt 
to much of the investigation into some of the grand scale corruption.  Parliament under President 
Kibaki introduced two sections to the ACECA.  §25(a) of the ACECA authorizes the cessation of 
investigations by the head of the KACC after consulting the Attorney General and Minister for 
Justice.211  §56(b) was further inserted to allow the government not to prosecute corruption 
suspects who has (1) given full disclosure of material facts of past corruption by himself or 
others; or (2) refunded all of the money or property acquired through their past corruption.212 
These amnesty provisions provided valuable immunity to some key players in past instances of 
governmental grand corruption which had robbed the country of millions of U.S. dollars.213  This 
is why Parliament had previously declined to pass similar legislation.214
 
 
These provisions effectively hindered investigations into past corruption within the upper 
echelons of government. This is seen in the recent corruption incident, the Grand Regency 
Scandal, which involved the repayment of funds from the Goldenberg Scandal years earlier.  Mr. 
Pattni, one of the chief architects of Goldenberg, agreed to give the expensive Grand Regency 
                                                          
211 Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) 2007, available at 
http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/pdfs/nov_07/Kenya_gazette.pdf 
212 Id. 
213 See infra, notes 216-21 and text accompanying. 
214 See supra note 91; see also James Thuo Gathii, Amnesty Plan Flies in the Face of War on Grant, BUSINESS 
DAILY AFRICA, Aug. 27, 2008 (discussing reasons such as the government’s reluctance to fight corruption and the 
possible immunization of high level government officials from prosecution to argue against amnesty provision). 
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Hotel he had allegedly built with Goldenberg monies over to the Kenyan government as 
reimbursement for his part in the scandal.  This hotel was widely valued at over $120 million, so 
while this was not a full reimbursement, it was a substantial victory for the government in 
retrieving funds it lost through grand corruption.  On the other hand, the contract came with a 
price.  Having admitted to corruption and returned some of what he stole, Mr. Pattni was now 
granted amnesty from future proceedings related to Goldenberg.   
 
The Kenyan government, now with a multimillion dollar hotel in its possession sought to sell its 
newly acquired asset.  Finance Minister Amos Kimunya, the center of the controversy, sold the 
property at a vastly deflated price and the Kenyan government only received $45 million for the 
hotel, roughly 1/3 of its market price.215
 
  The Finance Minister also disregarded procedural 
safeguards for the selling of government assets and basically made this sale unilaterally.  The 
Finance Minister did not even accept bids from private groups interested in buying the hotel 
before he sold it at the inadequate price. 
Finance Minister Kimunya’s actions led to calls for his resignation by the Attorney General 
Amos Wako among others.  These calls were eventually answered when Kimunya resigned in 
July of 2008.216
                                                          
215 Grand Regency Sage Displays Rot in Kenya’s Elite, THE NAIROBI CHRONICLE, June 30, 2008 available at 
http://nairobichronicle.wordpress.com/2008/06/30/grand-regency-saga-displays-rot-in-kenyas-elite/ 
  However, his time out of government did not last long.  The President created 
216 Kenya’s Finance Minister Resigns Over Scandal, CNN.Com, available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/07/08/kenya.resign/index.html 
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the Cockar Commission to investigate the incident.217  The Commission eventually cleared 
Kimunya of any wrongdoing and stated that his public condemnation was nothing more than a 
witch hunt.218  While this is allegedly what the report from the Commission said, it cannot be 
verified because President Kibaki refused to make the report public.219 Consequently, Minister 
Kimunya was controversially reinstated to his old post.220
 
 
Mwalimu Mati, the head of the anti-corruption watchdog reporting agency Mars Group Kenya 
has proclaimed the government to be as corrupt as it has been in years and likens it to the 
notoriously corrupt period of Daniel Arap Moi’s presidency.221
                                                          
217 See Outrage Over Kimunya’s Reappointment, EAST AFRICAN STANDARD, January 28, 2009 available at 
  President Kibaki’s pledge upon 
http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/multimedia/?StoryID=244169&p=Bureti&page=3; see also James Thuo Gathii, 
The Case for an Independent Counsel’s Office, BUSINESS DAILY AFRICA, July 16, 2008 (discussing the poor track 
record Commissions of Inquiry have had in unearthing corruption and proposing that making it independent from 
the government would improve its performance). 
218 Outrage over Kimunya’s Reappointment, EAST AFRICAN STANDARD, Jan. 28, 2009. 
219 Id. ("’The President is telling Kenyans that the appointment of the Cockar Commission was merely a public 
relations exercise. Why did he appoint it, receive its report but decline to make its findings public only to ambush 
Kenyans with the reappointment of the prime suspect it was created to probe?’" asked one former Minister.). 
220 Alphonce Shiundu, House to Decide Kimunya Fate, DAILY NATION, Jan. 28, 2009 available at 
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/521366/-/u1t4ih/-/index.html; see also Edward Kisiang’ani, Lack of Political 
Probity the Bane of Our Leadership, THE STANDARD, Feb. 23, 2009 (stating that Kimunya’s reappointment came 
against a backdrop of political disaffection) available at 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=1144007232&cid=15&. 
221 Andrew Cawthorne, “Kenya Corruption ‘Back to Moi-era Levels,’” REUTERS, March 6, 2009.  “It looks and feels 
like during the worst parts of the Moi government, especially from around 1990 when a feeding frenzy began.”  Id. 
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taking office to end corruption no longer seems to be of the utmost importance to neither he nor 
the rest of the government.   
 
The President and his incumbent ministers may have even resorted to corruption to retain their 
hold on Kenyan politics in the 2007 Presidential elections.  In a hotly contested election between 
President Mwai Kibaki and challenger Raila Odinga, both candidates ironically used an anti-
corruption platform as a rally point for their campaign.222  There was huge turnout for the 
election and it was easily Kenya’s most participated in election to date.223  When the results were 
unveiled Kibaki had garnered just enough votes to remain President.  This is despite the fact that 
Odinga had led in the polls leading up to the election and was thought of as the favorite to 
win.224  President Kibaki was alleged to have stuffed the ballot box with enough votes to retain 
his position as commander in chief.  His opponent even came right out and stated that Kibaki  
should admit he cheated, concede defeat and resign.225  It is also a generally accepted view in the 
international community that there was at least some vote rigging and corruption in the 2007 
election.226
                                                          
222 WRONG, supra note 181. 
  In the wake of the election, Kenyans turned to violence and looted and rioted with  
223 In all, over 9 million votes were cast in the election. Election Results 2007, Office of Government Spokesperson, 
available at http://www.communication.go.ke/elections/default.asp. 
224 See Raila’s Third Win, THE STANDARD, Oct. 23, 2007. 
225 Stephen Ndegwa, Raila Calls for Vote Recount, THE EAST AFRICAN STANDARD, December 30, 2007. 
226 The Chief European Observer, Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, had called the election results “flawed” and the 
United States Ambassador had strongly urged Kenya to perform a recount on the votes.  Jeffrey Gentleman, 
Disputed Vote Plunges Kenya into Bloodshed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2007.  The Election Commissioner Samuel 
Kivuitu, the Chairman of the Electoral Commission even expressed dissatisfaction with the results.  WRONG, Supra 
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ethnic clashes between the Kikuyu tribe, from which must of Kibaki’s government hails, and 
other tribes angry that they remained on the outside.227  This ethnic clash in the wake of the 2007 
election eventually left over a thousand Kenyans dead,228 hundreds of thousands of Kenyan’s 
displaced229
 
 and the country on the brink of Civil War.   
The harm corrupt government officials caused these so-called “Internally Displaced Persons” or 
IDP’s did not stop with the post-election violence.  Corruption remained prevalent and unabated 
in Kenya even after the post-election violence illuminated how fed up and angry Kenyans were 
with their governments longstanding corruption.  While the government spent “hundreds of 
millions of shillings to find new homes for [those displaced by the post-election violence] or to 
get them back to their farms,” much of this money found its way into the pockets of corrupt 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
note 182, at 306 (“’If it was up to me, I wouldn’t sign off on this’ Kivuitu had privately told EU observers, showing 
them returning officers’ forms bearing obvious signs of tampering. ‘But I’m alone here, and I want to live.’”). 
227 For a firsthand account of the post election violence, see WRONG, supra note 181 at 299-316; see also Scores 
Dead in Kenya Poll Clashes, BBC NEWS, December 31, 2007 available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7165602.stm, 
228 ICC to Probe Kenya Post-Election Violence, CBC NEWS, April 1, 2010 available at 
http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2010/04/01/icc-kenya-investigation.html. 
229 Estimates are that around 600,000 Kenyans were displaced following this violence.  See WRONG, supra note 182 
at 312 (“By mid-February . . . some 300,000 displaced Kenyans [were] living in camps and another 300,000 [were] 
on the move.”); ICC to Probe Kenya Post-Election Violence, CBC NEWS, April 1, 2010 (“hundreds were killed, 
thousands of women were raped, and more [than] 600,000 people were forced from their homes.”). 
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officials, rather than to those for whom it was intended.230  Over twenty district and provincial 
officials were expected to be charged with pocketing over 100 million Kenyan shillings.231  The 
officials were supposed to be compiling lists of persons who were displaced following the post-
election violence.232  However, they allegedly included fictitious names on the list and funds 
distributed to these non-existent people went directly into their pockets.233
 
 
Following the violence, a power sharing agreement was reached whereby Odinga was named to 
the new post of Prime Minister and a coalition government was formed with an equal number of 
ministers from Kibaki’s PNU (formerly NARC) party and Odinga’s ODM party.234
 
  However, it 
is not clear whether this coalition government has improved Kenya’s governance much beyond 
avoiding further violence.  
The coalition government has already been accused of siphoning off funds from the money 
allocated to aid the refugees of post-election violence.  It also appears that a lot of the efforts of 
the new Prime Minister and civil society in exposing high level corruption have been thwarted 
by their compatriots in the government.  For example, on February 13th 2010, PM Odinga 
                                                          
230 Dominic Wabala, Fat Cats Used IDP Money to Buy Posh City Homes, DAILY NATION, June 2, 2010 available at 
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Fat%20cats%20used%20IDP%20cash%20to%20buy%20posh%20city%20homes/-
/1056/931156/-/item/0/-/12ingi8/-/index.html. 
231 Id. 
232 Id.  The government intervened with its resettlement plan dubbed “Operation Rudi Nyumbani” after the poor 
living conditions, rampant disease, and inclement weather in the makeshift camps were revealed.  Id. 
233 Id. 
234 Edmund Sanders, Kenya to Build Coalition Government, BOSTON GLOBE, February 29, 2008. 
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suspended two ministers so as to pave the way for investigations into maize and free primary 
education.235  These suspensions could have also been in response to President Kibaki 
suspending several ministers and aides—many of which were from Odinga’s ODM party—days 
before for alleged corruption.236 However, just days later, Kibaki blocked the suspension Odinga 
had made and reinstated the two ministers claiming that such a suspension was illegal because he 
had not been consulted first.237
 
 
This kind of political infighting within the government is surely not a good sign for the future of 
Kenyan government.  This agreement was only brought about because of intense international 
pressure to stop the violence within Kenya following the election,238 and it appears that the two 
parties, forced into working together are only out to make each other’s lives difficult.  One thing 
is clear, this political infighting and petty bickering within the government will only serve to hurt 
the government’s fight against corruption and the Kenyan people the government is supposed to 
be helping.239
 
 
                                                          
235 Reuben Olita, Odinga Suspends Two Ministers, NEW VISION ONLINE, February 14, 2010. 
236 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Kenyan President Blocks Prime Minister’s Suspension of Two High Ranking Officials, 
N.Y. TIMES, February 15, 2010 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/15/world/africa/15kenya.html. 
237 Id. 
238 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Unity Cabinet Formed in Kenya, Ending Deadlock, N.Y. TIMES, April 14, 2008 available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/14/world/africa/14kenya.html. 
239 The corruption and infighting has already resulted in harm to the Kenyan government and its people.   
Responding to the massive graft that continues to take place in Kenya, Canada has changed the focus of its 
investigation away from Kenya and has begun to focus on other, less corrupt countries.  ‘Massive Graft’ Turns off 
Canadian Aid Tap, DAILY NATION, Oct. 14, 2010. 
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A) New Constitution in Kenya 
 
On August 27, 2010 the Kenyan government ratified a new constitution.240  In ratifying it, the 
government not only fortified its fight against corruption in the Constitution, but also gave the 
Kenyan people hope for a future free of government looting and pillaging.241  This constitution 
was founded on principles of “good governance, integrity, transparency, and accountability.242
 
 
While the current anti-corruption bodies remain in place for the time being, they will eventually 
give way to new bodies working under a constitutional mandate.  The Ethics and Anti-
Corruption Commission (EACC) will replace the KACC as the anti-corruption body in Kenya 
once passed by Parliament.  This development alone is a huge step forward for the Kenyan 
government.  It now has an anticorruption body constitutionally entrenched.  Along with this 
entrenchment comes the potential for it to have the constitutionally protected power to prosecute 
corruption crimes.  Section 156(7) states that “The powers of the Attorney-General may be 
exercised in person or by subordinate officers acting in accordance with general or special 
instructions.243
                                                          
240 Kenya President Ratifies New Constitution, BBC News, August 27, 2010.  Available at 
  In the same vein, the powers of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission are 
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addition to the functions and powers conferred by the Constitution.”244  The Constitution further 
provides that “Parliament may enact legislation conferring powers of prosecution on authorities 
other than the Director of Public Prosecution.”245  This means that the legislature can delegate to 
the EACC the power to pursue corruption suspects in the court system, rather than having to wait 
for the Attorney General to act on their governmental corruption reports – a wait that has been 
exceedingly long in the past.246
 
  However, this is not yet the reality for the EACC.   
It is imperative that Parliament confer this prosecutorial power to the EACC.  Because it has not 
been expressly conferred, any prosecution power at this point may be limited by a narrow 
reading of the constitution.  A court that has in the past relied on technicalities to defeat 
corruption247
 
 may continue this legacy because the Constitution does not affirmatively confer to 
the Commission the right to prosecute. This possibility alone is a criticism of the new Kenyan 
Constitution.  Given all the troubles the anticorruption commissions have had in the past trying 
to punish corruption through the legal system, it would have been prudent for the drafters to 
affirmatively confer the prosecutorial power to the EACC in the constitution rather than making 
a conferral of this type merely permissible.   
However, while not firmly settling the issue of prosecutorial power, the Kenyan Constitution did 
resolve many issues with the EACC that were divisive for its predecessors.   
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The newly ratified constitution will also retract the Public Officer Ethics Act.  Again, however, 
the principles of the Act have now been moved into the Constitution where they enjoy a 
protection and cemented-status that they did not previously have when set out solely via an Act 
of Parliament.248  Chapter 13 lays out the values and principles of Public Service.249
“high standards of professional ethics; efficient, effective and economic 
use of resources; responsive, prompt, effective, impartial and equitable provision 
of services; involvement of the people in the process of policy making, 
accountability for administrative acts; [and] transparency and provisions to the 
public of timely, accurate information.” 
  These 
include:  
250
 
 
This list is not exhaustive, as there are many other guidelines for government employees’ 
professional and personal behavior. Having these ‘high standards of professional ethics’251
 
 
cemented in the Constitution will make them fundamental to governmental performance and help 
eradicate corruption or unethical behavior in government before it even begins. 
In the past, the Public Officers Ethics Act not being embedded in the Constitution caused a great 
deal of litigation over whether the Act of Parliament was constitutional.  For example, 
governmental officials, many of whom undoubtedly had acquired vast amounts of wealth 
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through corrupt activities were opposed to the POEA’s mandatory declarations of wealth.252  
They fought this provision by claiming that it was unconstitutional, in violation of their right to 
privacy and fought to have their assets safe from disclosure.253
 
  This argument is no longer 
viable because the provision is now fundamentally constitutional and cannot be challenged 
because it is expressly provided that these declarations must be made.   
Similarly, the government now has a constitutionally-mandated requirement to be more 
transparent.  Not only is it provided that transparency is important and fundamental to the 
government, but section 35(1) requires the mandatory publishing of certain information to the 
public.254  The Constitution states that “[e]very citizen has the right of access to – (a) information 
held by the State; and (b) information held by another person and required for the exercise of any 
right of fundamental freedom.”255  This is a vital new right given to the citizens and duty 
imposed on the government.  In the past, many of the government contracts and affairs were kept 
secret and no one knew about who exactly the government had paid to do contracts and how 
much they had paid out.  This was a core problem with the Anglo Leasing scandal.256
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held responsible, largely because all of the government’s actions have been shrouded in mystery 
because no duty to disclose information was present at the time to hold the government 
transparent and accountable. 
 
Overall, by mandating through the constitution all of these provisions and aspects of good 
governance which had previously been paid only lip service, Kenya has taken a gigantic step 
towards minimizing governmental corruption.  The government must now follow through and 
enforce the constitutional provisions of good governance that it has laid out.   
 
The Kenyan government has already begun prosecuting high-level corruption cases more 
actively.  The Higher Education Minister William Ruto has been charged with fraud in the 
amount of K.Sh 96 million.257 He allegedly received the money in exchange for transferring 
parcels of land belonging to the Ministry of Natural Resources to the Kenya Pipeline 
Company.258  He has been charged with three counts of abuse of office and he had his 
constitutional objections rejected by a constitutional court.259
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actions.260
 
  This may have been the first showing from the Kenyan government that the days of 
unaccountable, corrupt ministers are over.   
Days after the constitutional court held that Mr. Ruto would face the fraud charges, President 
Kibaki suspended the minister.261  Under §62 of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 
however, the Minister will continue to be paid half his full time salary pending resolution of the 
case.262  This has led to calls for him to resign from the public, Justice Minister Mutula Kilonzo, 
and Gichugu MP Martha Karua.263  Mr. Ruto has dismissed these calls for resignation and 
asserts that these charges are nothing more than a political ploy to get him out of office.264
 
 
MP Ruto was not the only Minister to have his actions come under increased scrutiny following 
the new Constitution’s passage.  Foreign Affairs Minister Moses Wetang’ula and Permanent 
Secretary Thuita Mwangi were questioned before Parliament for their role in procuring Kenya’s 
missions abroad – procurements in which tax-payers allegedly lost millions of shillings.  This 
scandal involved Kenyan missions in multiple countries.  Property was purchased in Japan for a 
Kenyan embassy for K.Sh 1.75 billion when the property was later valued at a mere K.Sh 400 
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million.265  This purchase was made without the proper input of other departments; departments 
which would have been able to make a proper evaluation of the property’s value.266  The 
embassy in Pakistan was to cost K.Sh 366 million.267  However, twice the estimate  was 
increased until the price stood at K.Sh 523.268  Not only that, but the project currently stands at 
only 40% complete despite the increased payment and it appears that construction has halted.269  
Much of the money paid to buy the embassy in Egypt could not be accounted for.270  There have 
even been discrepancies for embassies being built in Europe as well.  The Kenyan embassy in 
Belgium was estimated to cost 3 million euros; however, an extra 850,000 euros was spent on 
second-hand furniture that has proven to be impractical and unnecessary.271  These stories of 
excess and graft in the Foreign Affairs Ministry go on and on and thankfully resulted in MP 
Wetang’ula’s resignation.272  The MP blamed civil servants for these corrupt transgressions and 
claimed his own innocence by saying ministers deal with policy and civil servants are the ones 
charged with transacting business with these other nations.273
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It is procurements such as these that were denounced in J.M. Migai Akech’s article Development 
Partners And Governance of Public Procurement in Kenya: Enhancing Democracy in the 
Administration of Aid.274  Procurements, the “principal means for through which governments 
meet developmental needs” present a problem because the discretionary nature of such 
procurements enables the government to get away with illicitly transferring funds from the 
government to the private sector.275  The discretion to award government contracts in developing 
countries continues to be used as a vehicle for political patronage.276
 
  This is especially true in 
developing countries where there is a huge amount of aid flowing into the countries for 
assistance in government reform and improvement.   
In the context of Kenya, 60% of government revenue is spent on procurements.  There are huge 
flaws in the Kenyan procurement framework, problems which are prevalent in developing 
countries throughout the world.  These problems prevent the government from properly 
distributing the aid and providing the services citizens.  This is in part because public officers are 
immunized from lawsuits against them in their personal capacity for any contracts they enter into 
on behalf of the government.277
 
  The system is therefore ripe for abuse.  This is apparent MP 
Wetang’ula’s resignation.  He and the civil servants under him are not personally liable for the 
hundreds of millions of Kenyan shillings they cost the Kenyan people.   
                                                          
274 37 NYU J. Int’l L. 829 (2006) 
275 Id. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. 
76 
 
Secondly,  Kenyan public servants are allowed to participate in private enterprises, there is 
therefore a huge conflict of interest when procurements are sought and there are firms bidding 
for it that are owned or invested in by the public servants making the decision! 278 In the same 
vein, a lack of transparency in the procurement system prevents public investigation and 
oversight to prevent corrupt contracts from being entered into.279
 
  Without transparency there is 
even less accountability in the procurement process.   
The Anglo-Leasing scandal is illustrative of these problems.  Public servants and ministers 
reaped enormous financial benefits from the Anglo-Leasing contracts.  Without any services 
actually being provided from the procurement money, they were able to pocket a huge portion of 
the money the government contracted to pay out for the goods and services.  Furthermore, it took 
a great deal of time for the scandal to be discovered.  The government is still uncovering more 
anglo-leasing type contracts and by the time it discovered the main corrupt procurement 
contracts, the money had been paid and was probably irrevocably lost.  This is a perfect example 
of how a lack of transparency in the procurement process breeds corruption. 
 
It is true that some of these deficiencies in the procurement process have been fixed since Anglo 
Leasing and other instances exposed the flaws in the system.  As Akech points out, the creation 
of the Public Procurement Complaints. Review and Appeals Board injected some oversight and 
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accountability into the procurement system.280  However, the administrative oversight is still not 
strong as it could be to prevent one of the most expensive forms of graft from taking place.  For 
example, by preventing the Board from entertaining complaints after the procurement contract 
has been concluded, many instances of graft have been unreviewable and therefore unsolved.281
 
  
Thus, although improvements have been made and frameworks are now better suited to deal with 
and prevent grand corruption, it is readily apparent that merely maintaining the status quo will 
not be enough to prevent corruption effectively. 
While the new anti-corruption framework has not been put into place, the passage of the 
Constitution has ushered in a new era in the fight against corruption.  The government’s tough 
stance on corruption has been made clear in public speeches as well.  PM Raila Odinga called 
out the Kenyan government to not make corruption acceptable behavior.282  Speaking at the 
opening of a hotel, PM Odinga stated that “We have identified corruption as a menace we have 
to deal with if we are to surge ahead, and we are facing it head on.”283  Furthermore, President 
Kibaki spoke about corruption after the resignation of MP Wetang’ula.284
 
  The President stated  
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“A person who plans to misuse public funds must not be allowed to continue 
working in Government. We must deal with those who want to embezzle public 
money... we will sack such fellows. Those who want to continue working on ways 
to steal public money should go home and let the new crop of professionals 
develop the country.”285
 
 
Such statements were oftentimes made hollowly and to appease the donors and public 
sympathies in the past.  However, here, coupled with the government’s actions in passing a new 
Constitution and going after corrupt ministers, the words no longer nearly ring as hollow as 
before. If there is one thing we have learned through this long fight against corruption, it is that 
anti-corruption efforts will never be truly successful absent individual and government-wide 
commitment to truly cease having corruption be a way of life. 
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Conclusion  
Kenya has had a long path in seeking to combat corruption. From its initial narrowly focused 
efforts at defining corruption to the broad-based institutional efforts it undertook as discussed in 
this paper. The latest turn in this journey is the August 2010 Constitution ratified 
overwhelmingly in a referendum. This Constitution entrenches a new Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission and embeds within it the ethical and professional guidelines of the Public Officers 
Ethics Act. The government is also now constitutionally required to be based on the principles of 
transparency and accountability. It also requires the mandatory publishing and making public 
access of information held by the State – such disclosure is likely to encourage more open, 
transparent and accountable government. If followed, the commands of the new Constitution are 
therefore likely to end the secrecy that made corruption rampant and pervasive to date. A new 
Chairman of the Kenya Anticorruption Commission and a judicial decision from a constitutional 
court dismissing an application to bar the prosecution of a cabinet minister who has recently 
resigned may be the first signs of a new turn in Kenya’s renewed efforts to combat corruption. 
Another cabinet minister has also resigned to pave way for investigations. 
However, it is too early to tell what the future holds. Almost every turn made to combat 
corruption in Kenya has been suffered setbacks –because the judiciary was unsympathetic to the 
broader anticorruption agenda or because Parliament or the Executive branch found ways to 
cover-up corrupt behavior. Further, a lot of the old corrupt guard remains in the government. 
These challenges remain even under the new Constitution. 
